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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Since January 1st 2005, all European listed companies have been obliged to adopt IFRS 
(International Financial Reporting Standards) in order to prepare their consolidated financial 
statements. IFRS-based reporting has changed the regulation framework compared to 
indigenous GAAP systems, which have now been dislodged in IFRS adopting jurisdictions 
(Carlin and Finch, 2008). Ravlic (2003) explains that the underlying idea for replacing the 
amortization method according to plan is that it does not convey valuable information for the 
users of financial statements. To support this, Donnelly and Keys (2002) state that goodwill 
impairment is reflected to the value of goodwill in a more information-conveying manner than 
the amortization over a set number of years. Colquitt and Wilson (2002) agree with this as the 
impairment test approach better satisfies the underlying expectations of the analysts and other 
financial statement users providing more meaningful information about intangible assets. The 
reason for this is that IFRS does not require amortization of goodwill on a straight-line basis 
irrespective of the individual situation. 
Over a substantial period of time, goodwill has been an extremely interesting and controversial 
subject in accounting (Jahmani et al. 2010; Davis, 2005; Ramanna and Watts, 2009). Goodwill 
can be defined as future-related benefits that arise from the assets which cannot be identified 
individually and thereby recognized separately. In accordance with IFRS 3, management is 
required to value all identifiable intangible and tangible assets at fair value prior to the goodwill 
recognition. In Finnish reporting environment, balance sheet items have not traditionally been 
valued at fair value but at acquisition cost. The matter regarding the qualified accounting 
treatment for goodwill has been challenged by both the financial statement preparers and the 
standard setters for decades (Qasim et al. 2013). Much of the debate concentrates on whether 
goodwill ought to be recognized as an asset, and if so, whether it ought to be subsequently 
amortized according to plan or written off as an impairment (Bugeja and Gallery, 2006). The 
IASB (2005) alleges that the impairment approach better captures the underlying value of 
goodwill compared to the amortization. Thereby, according to IAS 36, firms are required to test 
the goodwill for impairment annually – at least – and, if there is any indication for impairment, 
write off the goodwill. 
 2 
 
It is not, however, only the benefits that have emerged after the adoption of IFRS. As IFRS 3 
requires managers annually to perform an impairment test for goodwill, it simultaneously 
provides management the opportunity for accounting discretion by requiring them to make 
manifold important assumptions and estimates. The most important ones are the determination 
of cash-generating units (CGUs), the subsequent allocation of goodwill to CGUs and the 
recoverable amount estimates of these units as are discussed in more detail in section 2. (Qasim 
et al. 2013) Thereby, IFRS regarding goodwill accounting provides management lots of tools 
for creative accounting.  
In accordance with IAS 36, goodwill impairment testing requires substantial estimates from 
management compared to straight-line amortization method, thus making it prone to earnings 
management actions. The subjectivity by the managers provides opportunities for management 
to manipulate earnings, which may cause a distorted image in the financial statements provided 
for the shareholders and stakeholders of the company. Hence, it is important to examine if the 
adoption of IFRS has affected financial statements making them vulnerable to the actions of 
earnings management. A common characteristic for research examining earnings manipulation 
is that they do not take the macroeconomic environment into account. In other words, it is 
supposed that earnings management actions are not affected by the general economic conditions 
(Filip and Raffournier, 2014). This paper contributes to prior literature by taking financial crisis 
into account as well. Filip and Raffournier (2014) state that dramatic changes in the economic 
climate can be assumed to affect the firm’s propensity to manipulate earnings. Given this 
reason, financial crisis factor is rationalized to take into consideration.  
As section 3 depicts, earnings can be manipulated either with accrual-based or real activities 
earnings management. Usually earnings are manipulated due to external demand to meet 
earnings forecasts and increase share price, but earnings can be manipulated other way as well. 
It is completely possible for the company to manage the earnings to look worse, at least in a 
certain period. For instance, when things are already bad, clearing out the balance sheet does 
only little harm to the company’s reputation (Healy, 1985). This type of earnings management 
is called big bath (Healy, 1985). As goodwill can be regarded as a discretionary accrual due to 
the wide discretion granted for management, this paper focuses on accrual-based earnings 
management. The management might also choose a convenient time to recognize an 
impairment loss to smoothen the earnings (Jahmani et al. 2010). These types of earnings 
management, among others, are discussed in more detail in section 3. 
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In prior literature, the use of goodwill impairments to manage earnings has been examined to 
some extent (for example, see AbuGhazaleh et al. 2011; Alves, 2013; Bisogno, 2015; Jordan 
and Clark, 2004). Some of these studies focus on the SFAS 142 standard, which is quite similar 
to IAS 36. IFRS is obligatory in a plethora of countries, but reporting environments in different 
countries differ substantially. For example, prudence has been one of the main principles in 
Finnish accounting environment, and it still is despite the international accounting thinking 
(Virtanen, 2009). The principle of prudence denotes the use of historical costs instead of fair 
values. Hence, Finland offers an interesting environment to examine whether the use of fair 
values in IAS 36 has affected managements’ discretion regarding the goodwill impairments. To 
the author’s knowledge, no studies have solely focused on examining the goodwill impairments 
under IAS 36 as a tool of earnings management in Finnish listed companies. Alves (2013) 
focuses on the association between goodwill impairments and discretionary accruals in 
Portuguese listed firms, and Bisogno (2015) examines whether Italian publicly quoted 
companies use goodwill impairments to manipulate earnings. In accordance with this paper, 
they both use modified Jones model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate the 
discretionary accruals. 
 
1.2 The objective and scope of the research 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether there is an association between goodwill 
impairments and accrual-based earnings management – in general – in Finnish listed companies 
following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Moreover, this paper examines whether the 
goodwill impairments are associated with big bath actions. Condensed, the research question 
of this paper is as follows: 
Have Finnish listed companies used goodwill impairments to manipulate earnings following 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS? 
In this study, the focus is on IFRS 3 and IAS 36 -based goodwill recognition and impairment 
due to the fact that Finnish listed companies are to compile their consolidated financial 
statements in accordance with IFRS. It must be taken into consideration that the SFAS standards 
bear much resemblance to the IFRS standards regarding the goodwill recognition and goodwill 
impairment. Given this, prior literature focusing on SFAS 142 has also been used in the 
literature review of this paper.  
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As section 4 demonstrates, lots of studies have been conducted regarding goodwill impairments 
and earnings management. Notwithstanding this, this paper contributes to prior accounting 
literature in three ways. First, although Finnish listed companies have been included in many 
studies (for example, see André et al. 2015), the results regarding these companies have not 
been reported separately. Second, standard setters need to know whether certain standards and 
accruals are vulnerable to earnings management. Given these, standard setters may be aware of 
this regarding Portuguese and Italian listed companies, but Finnish reporting environment 
brings another dimension to this. Third, as company’s decision to impair goodwill or not seems 
to be an important corporate event due to the influence on firm performance and thus market 
value (Hirschey and Richardson, 2002), it is important to examine whether IFRS 3 and IAS 36 
constrain the management’s discretion to impair goodwill. Moreover, the results of this paper 
ought to be of interest to regulators and investors in the light of enhancing the quality of 
financial reporting. 
The concept of goodwill has been examined very widely, and it has been in the interest of 
researchers for a substantial period of time. Moreover, after the adoption of IFRS 3 and IAS 36, 
goodwill has been subsumed to earnings management actions as well. Given these, the literature 
review concentrates first on goodwill recognition and impairments according to IFRS 3 and 
IAS 36, after which on earnings management and the goodwill impairments as a part of earnings 
management actions. Furthermore, prior literature regarding goodwill impairments as a part of 
earnings management actions is presented as well. 
1.3 Research design and main findings 
The essential parts of this study are IFRS 3 (Business combinations) and IAS 36 (Impairment 
test). Throughout this paper, the abbreviation “IFRS” is used to refer to both IFRS and IAS 
standards. In addition to these standards, the bedrock of this study is built on the prior literature 
and research regarding aforementioned topics in section 1.2.  
The data for this paper are obtained from the Thomson Reuters Database comprising 4,230 
firm-year observations. However, the data are modified as not all companies meet the variable 
requirements elaborated in section 5. Hence, the final sample comprises 899 firm-year 
observations spanning from 2005–2014. In the empirical part of this paper, the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al. 1995) is first used to estimate the discretionary accruals. After this, the 
use of goodwill impairments to manipulate earnings – in general – is examined by using 
 5 
 
multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. Third, logistic regression model is 
used to examine whether the goodwill impairments are associated with big bath earnings 
management actions. 
The findings of this paper provide evidence that goodwill impairments are not associated with 
accrual-based earnings management nor big bath actions in Finnish listed companies. The 
number of goodwill impairments has drastically decreased after the adoption of IFRS compared 
to prior years when goodwill was amortized on a straight-line basis. In regards to financial 
crisis, goodwill impairments during are not either associated with earnings management 
actions. One possible underlying factor affecting the results might be the principle of prudence, 
which is the main principle in Finnish reporting environment. In the estimation model, the only 
factors that seem to affect the earnings manipulation are firm size and value of total accruals. 
In addition to these, firm performance affects negatively big bath behavior. 
1.4 The structure of the study 
The structure of this study is as follows. In section 2, the concepts of goodwill under IFRS 3 
and impairment test under IAS 36 are presented thoroughly. A thorough insight is rationalized 
in order to demonstrate the extent of discretion managers are permitted by IFRS. In section 3, 
the concept of earnings management, the detection of it, and its relation to goodwill 
impairments are explained. In section 4, prior literature regarding the goodwill impairments as 
a tool of earnings management is reviewed. The literature presented is not exhaustive, yet it is 
chosen because of its importance and close relation to the topic of this study. In section 5, the 
hypotheses of this paper are formulated. Prior to this, the special characteristics of Finnish 
reporting environment are presented. Even though the IFRS standards are the same 
internationally, the reporting environments differ from each other in different countries. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to give an insight of main principles which prevail in Finnish 
reporting environment. In section 6, the data and research design are presented. Section 7 
demonstrates the results of this paper, including the robustness tests. Finally, section 8 
concludes with practical implications and future research suggestions. 
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2. GOODWILL AND THE IMPAIRMENT TEST  
 
Goodwill accounting has been one of the most controversial issues in the history of modern 
accounting (Alves, 2013). The topic emerges especially in the accounting of business 
combinations to be used after mergers and acquisitions (Giner and Pardo, 2014). Especially, 
the initial recognition as well as measurement to the fair value subsequent to initial recognition 
have been debated by standard-setters (Shahwan, 2004). Over the years, there have been various 
accounting treatments of purchased goodwill as follows: immediate write-off against reserved, 
capitalization with amortization over a pre-selected number of years, and capitalization with 
annual impairment reviews (Hubenthal et al. 2002). 
In this section, the concept of goodwill is depicted first. To give more thorough view of the 
topic, both prior research and standard-based literature are used. Second, the goodwill 
impairment test and its phases are elaborated. These topics are explained in accordance with 
IFRS as Finnish listed companies are stipulated to prepare their financial statements under IFRS 
regulation. 
2.1 Goodwill as an asset 
Goodwill arises in two different situations. First, it can be either internally generated, or second, 
it can be acquired as a part of the acquisition of another company (business combination). It is 
worthwhile to notice that goodwill appears in the financial statements only if an acquisition has 
occurred. In business combinations, goodwill is defined as the difference between the cost of 
the purchase and the fair value of the net assets. Internally generated goodwill, however, is not 
recognized. (Alves, 2013) 
According to Johnson and Petrone (1998), some believe that goodwill should be recognized as 
an asset, while others, e.g. Gore and Zimmerman (2010) argue that it should not be. Johnson 
and Petrone (1998) infer that goodwill can be seen to arise from either of the following 
perspectives: a “top-down perspective”, which considers goodwill as being a component or 
subset of something larger, or a “bottom-up perspective”, in which goodwill can be seen in 
terms of the components making it up.  
In the top-down perspective, goodwill may be viewed as a component of the acquirer’s 
investment in the acquiree, which is based on the acquirer’s expectations about future earnings 
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emerging from the acquiree and the business combination. Under this perspective, the issue is 
regarded in terms of whether the larger item – the investment – can be determined as an asset. 
If it can be, the components integral to it are defined as subsets of that larger asset and hence 
accounted for as assets. According to the bottom-up perspective, if the price paid by the acquirer 
exceeds the fair value of the net identifiable assets of the acquiree, other resources which – 
obviously – have value to the acquirer, were acquired. At the broadest, goodwill can be 
considered as the “purchase premium”. This implies the premium paid by the acquirer over the 
book value of the acquiree’s net assets. Goodwill can be seen comprising the following parts: 
1) Excess of the fair values over the book values of the acquired entity’s recognized net assets, 
2) fair values of other net assets  which have not been recognized by the acquired entity, 3) fair 
value of the going concern element of the acquired entity’s existing business, 4) fair value of 
the expected synergies from combining the acquiring entity’s and acquired entity’s net assets 
and businesses, 5) overvaluation of the consideration paid by the acquiring entity; and 6) 
overpayment or underpayment by the acquiring entity. (Johnson and Petrone, 1998) 
Component 1 cannot be recognized as an asset as it instead reflects gains not recognized by the 
acquiree on its net assets thus being part of those rather than part of goodwill. Component 2 are 
considered intangibles which may be separately identified and thereby recognized as individual 
assets rather than goodwill. Thus, components 1 and 2 both relate to the acquiree and are not 
notionally part of goodwill. Component 5 can be defined as a measurement error rather than 
asset, and component 6 represents a loss (or gain). Hence, components 5 and 6 are not part of 
goodwill. Component 3 may be regarded as pre-existing goodwill which was internally 
generated by the acquiree or acquired by it in a previous business combination, and may be 
referred to as “going-concern goodwill”. Going-concern goodwill is defined as the ability of an 
established business to earn a higher return on an organized collection of net assets than would 
be expected if those assets and liabilities were acquired separately. Component 4 would not 
exist without the combination as it results from the combination and thus might be regarded as 
“combination goodwill”. Thus, only components 3 and 4 can be regarded as goodwill, and may 
be referred to as “core goodwill”. (Johnson and Petrone, 1998) These components of goodwill 
are presented in figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Components of goodwill (Johnson and Petrone, 1998) 
 
Johnson and Petrone (1998) mention that there are three criteria set for goodwill to be qualified 
as an asset: 1) it bespeaks a probable future benefit involving a capacity to affect cash flows in 
the future, 2) it is possible for an entity to obtain the benefits and control it; and 3) the 
transaction that gives rise to an entity’s right to or control of the benefits has occurred. IAS 38 
definition of an intangible asset is in line with the above mentioned. However, according to 
Gore and Zimmerman (2010), an asset ought to be an identifiable resource and hence be 
something that exists independently. They conclude that synergy, for instance, is not something 
to be considered to have independent existence and hence ought not to be reported on the 
balance sheet. 
2.2 Goodwill according to IFRS 3 
The recognition of goodwill in financial statements is regulated by IFRS 3 (Business 
combinations) standard by International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The first version 
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of IFRS 3 was issued in 2004, and the current revised version has been in use since January 
2013. 
The purpose of IFRS 3 standard is to enhance the reliability, relevance and comparability of 
information regarding business combinations and their effects. It covers the initial recognition 
and measurement of acquired assets and liabilities from the business combinations, as well as 
the determination of goodwill. 
2.2.1 Business combinations 
The first task in applying IFRS 3 is to determine whether a transaction is a business 
combination. According to the standard (IFRS 3.B7), the business combination must involve 
the acquisition of a business, that is, three elements must be fulfilled: 
1) Inputs – an economic resource (e.g. non-current assets) that creates outputs when one 
or more processes are applied to it 
2) Process – a system applied to an input creates an output (e.g. strategic management) 
3) Output – inputs resulting from processes. 
IFRS 3 also requires that the assets and liabilities acquired by the acquiring entity generate a 
business. In other words, the business could be practiced solely with the assets and liabilities 
acquired. If this criterion is not met, the acquirer must treat the transaction as an acquisition of 
assets. 
2.2.2 Acquisition method 
IFRS 3 requires the business combinations to be performed by using acquisition method. Many 
firms preferred the pooling method, arguably because of its more favorable effect on future 
earnings compared to the acquisition method (Dunne, 1990). IFRS 3 standard (IFRS 3.5) states 
that the acquisition method comprises the following steps: 1) Identification of the acquirer, 2) 
Determination of the acquisition date, 3) Recognition and measurement of the identifiable 
assets acquired, the liabilities assumed and any non-controlling interest, and 4) Recognition and 
measurement of goodwill or a gain from a bargain purchase. In this section, these steps are 
elaborated. 
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Identification of the acquirer 
IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements guides that the acquiring entity must be identified 
in a business combination. According to this, the acquiring entity is the one to obtain the control 
of the acquired entity (IFRS 3.7). An investor obtains control of an investee when it is exposed, 
or has right, to variable returns from its involvement with the investee and has the ability to 
affect those returns through its power over the investee (IFRS 10:5-6; IFRS 10:8). However, if 
it is not clearly indicated by IFRS 10 who the acquiring entity is, IFRS 3 suggests alternative 
guidance on the issue. 
Determination of the acquisition date 
IFRS 3 defines the acquisition date as the date when the acquiring entity obtains control of the 
acquired entity. In other words, the day when the acquirer assigns the payment, and acquires 
the assets and liabilities of the acquired entity.  
Recognition and measurement of the identifiable assets acquired and liabilities assumed, 
and non-controlling interest 
The acquisition method requires the acquiring entity to identify and measure assets and 
liabilities stemming from the business combination. These assets and liabilities shall be 
measured at the fair values of the acquisition date (IFRS 3.18). Fair value is used if the asset or 
liability has a quoted market price in an active market. As many firm-specific assets lack quoted 
market prices, these assets are valued by the management, which makes the write-downs of the 
assets vulnerable to managerial estimation (Rees et al. 1996). When calculating the possible 
impairment, it is subject to management’s estimation, and hence might not be relied on (Bloom, 
2009). Some studies (Jennings et al. 1996; Godfrey and Koh, 2001) document that 
management’s valuation on intangible assets is beneficial as there are no material errors or 
biases. Assets and liabilities stemming from the business combination are recognized if, and 
only if, they meet IFRS 3’s recognition principles on the acquisition date. These assets, 
however, shall not be the same as those recognized in the acquired entity’s own financial 
statements. (IFRS 3) 
IFRS 3 defines an asset and a liability as the following: 
“Asset is a resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future 
economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity” (IFRS 3.11). 
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“Liability is a present obligation of the entity arising from past events, the settlement of which 
is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources embodying economic benefits” 
(IFRS 3.12). 
According to IFRS 3, intangible assets are important to be identified separately as in the 
majority of cases their lives are finite, and amortization under IAS 38 Intangible Assets is 
required. Sacui and Szatmary (2015) state that intangible assets can be characterized as assets 
that are based mainly on information and knowledge. They also allude to the fact that intangible 
assets have no physical existence, and mainly they are hard to recognize due to which they 
ought to be subject to a structured identification process. Villalonga (2004) points out that the 
intangible asset which can be an advantage for the company is probably of different kind of 
nature in different sectors and industries. Under IFRS 3, intangible assets, which have been 
acquired in a business combination, shall be separately identified from goodwill if they 1) meet 
the general recognition principles of IFRS 3, and 2) are identifiable (IFRS 3. B31-B34). This 
supports the proposed view of Sacui and Szatmary (2015) indicating that a structured 
identification process ought to be taken into consideration.  
Non-controlling interest emerges if an acquiring entity does not entirely own the equity in the 
acquired entity. Under IFRS 3, the non-controlling interest must be measured at fair value. If a 
quoted market price is available for the non-controlling interest, it shall be used as a fair value. 
Otherwise, the acquiring entity shall use other valuation methods to measure the non-
controlling interest at fair value. (IFRS 3. B44) 
Recognition and measurement of goodwill or gain from a bargain purchase 
According to IFRS 3, the final step of acquisition cost method is to determine goodwill or a 
gain from a bargain purchase. Goodwill resulting from a business combination ought to be 
recognized on the acquiring entity’s balance sheet whereas gain arising from bargain purchase 
shall be recorded through profit and loss statement (IFRS 3). 
Goodwill is measured as following: 1) consideration paid by the acquiring firm, 2) the 
aggregation of non-controlling interests, 3) any previously held equity interests are measured 
at fair value, and aggregated, and 4) identifiable net assets of the acquired entity are deducted. 
This is illustrated in figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Recognition of goodwill under IFRS 3 
2.3 The impairment test of goodwill according to IAS 36 
Acquired goodwill must be dealt with in the accounting records of company. Over the years, 
there have been arguments whether it ought to be expensed immediately, amortized over a set 
number of years or subject to impairment tests. Over the years, all of the aforementioned have 
been mandatory in different accounting regimes, but currently it is subject to impairment test. 
This, however, gives management a lot of discretion. (Giner and Pardo, 2014) 
2.3.1 Cash-generating unit 
A cash generating unit (CGU) is defined as “the smallest identifiable group of assets that 
generates cash inflows that are largely independent of the cash inflows from other assets or 
groups of assets.” (IAS 36.6) When identifying a CGU, an entity must assess whether the group 
of assets generate largely independent cash flows, and whether there is an active market for the 
output: 
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Figure 3. Identifying CGUs 
 
In order to identify a CGU, the entity must be divided into different terms of components. As 
the definition of CGU derives from cash inflows, the component classification process ought 
to concentrate on the revenue sources of the entity, and how the assets of the entity contribute 
to revenue generation. Managers shall contemplate, for instance, how the operations of an entity 
are monitored or how the decisions regarding continuing or abolition of the operations and 
assets of an entity are made. However, there is no certain composition or nature of CGU as it 
varies from entity to entity, and is determined largely by entity specific factors. (IAS 36.69) 
Allocating assets to the CGU 
Following the identification of its CGUs, an entity shall determine which assets are included in 
certain CGUs. Before allocating an asset to the CGU, the entity must determine the recoverable 
amount for the assets. It is defined as the highest of (a) fair value less costs of disposal, and (b) 
value in use. According to IAS 36, only assets contributing to the cash flows of a CGU must be 
allocated to this certain CGU. However, IAS 36.6 defines corporate assets as assets – excluding 
goodwill – which are expected to generate future cash flows of all CGUs of the entity.  
Allocating goodwill to the CGU 
As goodwill does not directly contribute to cash flows, the recoverable amount of goodwill 
cannot be determined separately from other assets. However, goodwill does contribute to the 
cash flows in single CGUs or multiple CGUs. Therefore, goodwill shall be allocated to these 
single or groups of CGUs due to the test for impairment. (IAS 36.81)  
Group of assets: largely independent of the cash inflows? 
Active market for the output? 
Not a CGU Identifiable CGU 
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IAS 36.80 requires that acquired goodwill shall be allocated to all of the acquiring entity’s 
CGUs or multiple CGUs. These CGUs must, however, be expected to gain from the synergies 
emerging in the business combination. According to IAS 36.80, CGUs to which goodwill is to 
be allocated must 
a) Represent the lowest level within the entity at which the goodwill is monitored for 
internal management purposes; and 
b) Not be larger than an operating segment, as defined by IFRS 8. 
In other words, this means that goodwill shall be allocated separately to CGUs that are no larger 
than individual operating segments before any operating segments are considered for 
aggregation for the purposes of the segmental disclosures. 
Discretion regarding the CGUs 
Creating a CGU for an entity gives lots of discretion for managers. Managers could avoid 
goodwill write-offs for many years, increasing the value of assets allocated to the CGUs to 
avoid impairments, and report a substantial loss in a year marked by particularly good 
performances. This method is called an income minimization method, which is elaborated in 
section 3. The strong heterogeneity of companies’ structure and enormous sizes equipped with 
an ever wide range of intangible assets have decreed the increasing difficulty in measuring a 
reliable value of the CGU elements emerging from business combinations. Considering that the 
increase in the size of the CGU augments the difficulty in identifying its asset whereas its 
decrease becomes impossible to curb the effects of the expected benefits of goodwill, it is clear 
how this has significantly expanded the discretion of managers. (Caruso et al. 2016) 
According to Caruso et al. (2016), IAS 36 has made an attempt to be helpful in solving the 
manager discretion problem by providing a lower and an upper limit in the configuration of the 
CGU, in relation to goodwill. Caruso et al. (2016) state that this is precisely the problem as 
managers can intervene here: after having to rely on reports and management plans generated 
by the internal control systems, managers are asked to give their opinion about the mechanism 
of aggregation of assets and about their attitude to generate cash flows independently.  
The process of identification of the CGU requires extensive use of discretion by managers. As 
the identification of a CGU is the first step for impairment testing (and also the most important 
one in terms of significance), the managers can act with wide freedom right from the beginning 
in case they want to manipulate numbers for opportunistic purposes. (Caruso et al. 2016) 
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2.3.2 The phases and the timing of an impairment test 
Phases of an impairment test 
As it has been mentioned, in regards to an asset or a CGU, the recoverable amount is defined 
as the higher of its fair value less costs of disposal and its value in use (IAS 36.6). According 
to IAS 36, fair value is defined as the price received from the transaction or to pay a liability at 
the measurement date. Costs of disposal are defined as additional costs deriving from the 
disposal of an asset. However, these costs do not include income tax expenses or financial costs. 
In proportion, value in use is defined as the present value of the future cash flows contributed 
by an asset of a CGU. (IAS 36.6) 
Following the calculation of the recoverable amount of an asset, the recoverable amount shall 
be compared to the carrying amount – book value – of an asset. According to IAS 36.97, if a 
CGU – formed by certain assets – to which the goodwill has been allocated is tested for possible 
impairment simultaneously with these certain assets, the assets are tested prior to the 
impairment test of the CGU. Similarly, if the goodwill has been allocated to a group of CGUs, 
and this group is subject to an impairment test simultaneously with the individual CGUs, the 
individual ones have to be tested prior to the group.  
If the carrying amount of an asset exceeds the recoverable amount, this difference must be 
impaired through the profit and loss statement (IAS 36.59). In regards to a CGU, the similar 
difference has to be impaired if the carrying amount of a CGU exceeds the recoverable amount. 
If an impairment loss is recognized, it shall be first deducted from the carrying amount of 
goodwill (IAS 36.104). Subsequently, the rest of the impairment loss shall be allocated to the 
other assets of the CGU on a pro rata basis. However, it must be taken into account that – in 
regards to allocation of an impairment loss – it is not possible for an entity to decrease the 
carrying amount – book value – of an asset below the highest of 1) fair value less cost of 
disposal, 2) value in use; and 3) zero (IAS 36.105). In accordance with IAS 36, a reversal of a 
recognized impairment is not possible (IAS 36.124). 
Timing of an impairment test 
According to IAS 36, an entity shall perform an impairment test, and hence the recoverable 
amount of an asset shall be estimated. This is performed to discover any indication of an 
impairment at the end of each reporting period. (IAS 36.9) However, an impairment test must 
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be performed annually for certain assets even though there would not be any indication of an 
impairment. These certain assets are as follows:  
1) Intangible assets with an indefinite useful life 
2) Intangible assets not yet available for use; and 
3) Goodwill acquired in a business combination. (IAS 36.10) 
The indicator-based impairment testing applies also to these above mentioned intangible assets. 
In addition, if the asset was recognized initially during the current annual period, the intangible 
asset (or goodwill) ought to be subject to an impairment test before the end of that annual period 
(IAS 36.10). The aforementioned applies also if the allocated goodwill has been acquired in a 
business combination during that annual period (IAS 36.96). The annually performed 
impairment test can be performed anytime in that annual period. However, it must be noted that 
this test shall be performed at the same time annually (IAS 36.10, IAS 36.96). Notwithstanding 
this, it is possible to test assets for an impairment at different dates if these dates are consistent 
for each.  
Dahmasha et al. (2009) state that the transition to impairment-based reporting regimes for 
goodwill has enhanced the relevance of financial information. Nonetheless, some researchers 
have disagreed with this view by rationalizing that testing goodwill for impairment is too 
intricate in nature and subject to management’s assumptions in determining the parameters used 
in the process of testing for impairment (Harris and Caplan, 2002; Jahmani et al. 2010; Massoud 
and Rayborn, 2003; Mayorga and Sidhu, 2012). Moreover, Harris and Caplan (2002) suggest 
that the result of the annual impairment test is too widely affected by management’s accounting 
choices under the new testing regime. In regards to goodwill impairment testing, the discretion 
provided to management may affect that the selection of the timing of the impairment test might 
be internally influenced (Ji, 2013). On the one hand, Ji (2013) states that management may 
conservatively accelerate goodwill impairment charges and report as extraordinary items. On 
the other hand, managers may ‘roll the dice’, that is, hoping to avoid goodwill impairment 
charges (Henning et al. 2004; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ramanna and Watts, 2007). Although 
IFRS 3 requires managers to perform goodwill impairment tests annually, it gives management 
lots of discretion by requiring them to make manifold accounting choices (AbuGhazaleh et al. 
2011)
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3. EARNINGS MANAGEMENT  
 
Earnings management is a relevant topic in financial accounting studies (Caruso et al. 2016). 
The phenomenon of intentional manipulation of financial reporting results has been widely 
studied from the early 1960s under the comprehensive label of earnings management theory 
(Beaver, 1968). Several studies (Francis et al. 1996; Hilton and O’Brien, 2009; Szczesny and 
Valentincic, 2013) show how a certain degree of discretion related to asset valuation has been 
widely adopted to reach earnings levels otherwise unreachable. Among such assets, goodwill 
proves to determine substantial impact on investment profits and share value (Shalev et al. 
2010). 
In this section, the concept of earnings management is elaborated. This is done by defining 
earnings management, illustrating the incentives of earnings management, and depicting the 
methods of detecting earnings management. Moreover, an insight of how goodwill impairments 
are related to earnings management actions is given. 
3.1 Definition of earnings management 
An interesting contribution on a framework for earnings management research is the work of 
Ronen and Yaari (2008), in which the various forms of earnings management can be traced to 
three main categories (black, grey, and white earnings management, in descending order of 
manipulation), based on the aims of the CEO. They define white earnings management as 
exploiting the discretion regarding the accounting choices to convey management’s private 
information on future cash flows. Accordingly, if the accounting choice is selected on the basis 
of opportunistic behavior, that is, maximizing the utility of management, this is defined as gray 
earnings management. Finally, if management uses different kinds of manoeuvres to 
misrepresent financial information, or deliberately prevents the users of financial statements 
from obtaining transparent information, this is defined as black earnings management. 
Scott (2009: 403) states that earnings management can be seen as an accounting choice by 
management to affect earnings. Especially, if these accounting choices are practiced to reach 
an earnings objective set in advance by management, this is defined as earnings management. 
On the other hand, if managers deliberately do not convey the true earnings-based information 
which increases the shareholder value, this is also seen as earnings management (Scott, 2009: 
403). According to Stolowy and Breton (2004), earnings management is defined as 
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manipulating accounts. In this sense, managers are given the discretion to make decisions 
regarding accounting policy or transactions which enable the transfer of wealth between firm 
and society, fund providers or management. One of the most commonly used definition for 
earnings management is proposed by Healy and Wahlen (1999): 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alert financial reports to either mislead some stakeholder about 
the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Emphasis added) 
According to their view, managers abuse their judgement in communicating the economic and 
financial situation of the company deliberately to deceive stakeholders about the real economic 
performance. This indicates that managers might act in a purely opportunistic way.  
Notwithstanding more than a number of scientific contributions, there is, however, no such 
definition for earnings management that would have reached consensus among researchers. 
This might be related to the different forms of manipulation of information and accounting 
values that can be realized in the process of elaboration of financial reporting of a firm. Due to 
its elusive concept, it is difficult to share a unique, universal definition. (Caruso et al. 2016) 
Earnings management can create information asymmetry between management and investors 
by making it difficult for financial statement users to accurately assess firm financial 
performance, even though effective reporting regulatory environments help limit this behavior 
(Evans et al. 2015).  
3.2 Incentives for earnings management 
According to Watts (1977), individuals maximize their own self-interests for which the 
financial statements serve as an equilibrium. Undeniably, earnings management is practiced 
due to the misalignment of incentives between management and users of financial statements. 
Obviously, management is likely to act in its own self-interest at the expense of the users of 
financial statements. However, as shareholders strive for, on the one hand, maximizing the firm 
value, and optimal contracting on the other hand, they have both external and internal demand 
for earnings management (Dye, 1988).  
The incentives of earnings management are typically enumerated as the following: 1) valuation 
incentives, 2) contractual incentives, and 3) regulatory incentives (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; 
Fields et al. 2001). Gordon (1964) investigates the relationship between stock prices and 
accounting policy focusing on valuation incentives. Subsequently, Watts and Zimmerman 
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(1978) developed positive accounting theory, which introduced both contractual and regulatory 
incentives into the field of earnings management. 
3.2.1 Valuation incentives 
The most important group to use financial statements is arguably investors (Barth et al. 2001). 
Thus, it is presumable that managers practice earnings manipulation to affect the firm value. 
Earnings management actions prior to initial public offerings (IPOs) were examined – among 
the first – by Aharony et al. (1993). Even though this study finds no evidence of earnings 
management, subsequent study documents upwards earnings manipulation by using income-
increasing accruals (Friedlan, 1994) and by selecting appropriate accounting policies regarding 
depreciation method and inventory valuation (Neill et al. 1995). Moreover, Teoh et al. (1998) 
document similar evidence and, in addition, they find that post-IPO earnings are negatively 
associated with earnings management.  
According to Storå (2013), if the purchase price is paid in shares, acquirers are more likely to 
manipulate earnings upwards in connection with takeovers since the higher the share price, the 
more the acquiring cost will be decreased as the amount of shares which are transferred to pay 
the purchase price is decreased. Erickson and Wang (1999) confirm this as they find that 
acquiring companies are engaged in upwards earnings manipulation actions prior to stock-for-
stock mergers. Furthermore, Christie and Zimmerman (1994) find that firms being the targets 
of takeovers manage earnings upwards prior to the takeover.  
Earnings management actions have been exercised prior to management buyouts (MBOs) as 
well. For instance, managers considering an MBO are likely – or at least, they have an incentive 
– to engage in upwards earnings management actions as they strive for reducing the value of 
the company (Storå, 2013). DeAngelo (1986) examines earnings management prior to MBOs 
but finds no evidence on earnings manipulation. On the contrary, Perry and Williams (1994) 
and Wright et al. (2006) document that management manage earnings downwards prior to 
MBOs.  
3.2.2 Contractual incentives 
It is general that some terms of contracts depend on the accounting figures. These kinds of 
contracts are used to motivate the management, for example. The bonus plan hypothesis (Healy, 
1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986: 208) illustrates the idea of managers practicing earnings 
manipulation to enhance their compensation if the compensation is contingent on accounting 
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figures. This would obviously motivate the management to upward the numbers to reach certain 
thresholds. Healy (1985) reports evidence supporting the bonus plan hypothesis. According to 
his study, firms manage earnings upwards if the earnings are between the lower and upper 
bound, indicating that managers were paid higher bonus payments. Moreover, Healy (1985) 
also finds that firms manage earnings downwards if the upper bound target is beaten, or if the 
lower bound seems to be unreachable. Holthausen et al. (1995) document that firms engage in 
earnings-reducing earnings management actions only if the upper bound is beaten. 
In addition to bonus plan hypothesis, some debt contracts are also contingent on accounting 
figures (Storå, 2013). According to the debt covenant hypothesis, managers are likely to manage 
earnings if the debt covenants are likely to be violated (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986: 216). 
Beneish and Press (1993), and Dichev and Skinner (2002) find evidence consistent with debt 
covenant hypothesis. 
3.2.3 Regulatory incentives 
The political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986: 235) illustrates the idea of firms 
practicing earnings manipulation if a firm can avoid different kinds of regulation costs 
stemming from political process. This means that firms which are exposed to publicity or the 
surveillance of authorities, are most likely engaged in earnings management. Moyer (1990) 
documents that banks manage earnings to meet capital adequacy requirements. Boynton et al. 
(1992) find that earnings management actions are associated with taxation, as firms manage 
earnings downwards to reduce the tax burden. 
3.3 Methods for earnings management 
Earnings comprise the cash flows and accruals during an accounting period. Given this, 
earnings can be manipulated through the cash flows or accruals. (Storå, 2013) Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2005) bisect the earnings management actions into real activities management 
and accounting earnings management based on whether the earnings are manipulated through 
cash flows or accruals respectively.  
3.3.1 Real activities management   
According to real activities management, the purpose is to diverge from the normal operational 
practices as management strives for misleading – at least some – stakeholders to believe that 
certain financial reporting targets are met (Roychowdhury, 2006). Ewert and Wagenhofer 
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(2005) define real activities management as a purpose of diverging from the optimal plan of 
actions to deliberately influence only earnings.  
By engaging in real activities management, managers make choices potentially harmful to the 
interests of the same company in the medium to long term. There is indeed a tendency of the 
managers to pay more attention on short-term results, because they are signal of a good 
management and because the related positive results can increase the estimate of stakeholders 
– primary shareholders – with respect to manager themselves. REM can directly modify annual 
income through actions that affect mainly the registration of costs and revenues or it can focus 
directly on financial statement. (Caruso et al. 2016) 
Prior literature regarding real activities management concentrates on R&D spending. For 
instance, Dechow and Sloan (1991) find that CEOs decrease the firm’s R&D spending right 
before the end of the tenure to enhance earnings performance in the short-run. Baber et al. 
(1991) find that firms cut down R&D expenses to meet the earnings targets. Also, firms 
repurchase stock options to avoid the dilution of earnings per share (Bens et al. 2003). What is 
most interesting from this study’s point of view, is that firms structure business combinations 
so that pooling method could be selected. In practice, by applying the pooling method, firms 
avoid the goodwill recognition and impairments as well. (Aboody et al. 2000; Ayers et al. 2002) 
3.3.2 Accounting earnings management 
According to Storå (2013), accounting earnings management is regarded as a way to treat 
business transactions. In regards to this, accounting earnings management can be subdivided 
into two groups based on whether firm practices earnings management by selecting an 
appropriate accounting policy, or by manipulating earnings through accruals. Choosing an 
appropriate accounting policy influences accruals indirectly while manipulating accruals 
implies direct use of discretion. Clearly, goodwill impairments as a part of earnings 
manipulation can be regarded as accrual-based earnings management. Given this rationale, this 
paper focuses on accounting earnings management. 
Previous studies find that firms intend to manipulate earnings by selecting appropriate 
accounting policies, for instance, inventory valuation and depreciation methods (Neill et al. 
1995). Regarding accrual-based earnings manipulation, prior studies also find that earnings are 
managed due to provisions for bad debt (McNichols and Wilson, 1988), through sales and 
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operating expenses (Plummer and Mest, 2001) and asset write-downs (Strong and Meyer, 1987; 
Riedl, 2004). 
As Caruso et al. (2016) reports, accounting earnings management allows directors to use 
opportunistically the direction granted for the determination of accounting values subject to 
estimates and assumptions. They divide accounting numbers included in financial reporting 
into objective and subjective ones. While the first cannot be distorted going forward in time, 
the latter contain estimated values and assumptions, and therefore may be subject to change 
over time. They distinguish four types of accrual-based practices: 
1) income smoothing; 
2) income maximization; 
3) income minimization; and 
4) big bath accounting. 
Regarding income smoothing, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) state that high levels of 
performance in a given period may create expectations of an equivalent or even greater future 
growth, bending to the so called trail effect. Caruso et al. (2016) suggest to avoid a future 
penalty by postponing revenues to the future, less fortunate years. Income smoothing policies, 
therefore, have the objective of standardizing the growth maintaining levels slightly above the 
obtained in the previous year (Caruso et al. 2016). Lhaopadchan (2010) finds that if firms are 
facing a combination of uncertainty and discretion granted for the management, the decisions 
to impair asset seem to be related to income smoothing. 
Income maximization policies provide the anticipation of the revenue and the deferral costs, 
with the only goal to maximize the possible income for the current year. This technique makes 
sense only if there are strong incentives and only under certain conditions: the chance of 
breaking a debt covenant or, where appropriate, the expectations of shareholders or analysts; 
another case in which it might be appropriate is in case of extraordinary operations, most 
notably mergers. (Caruso et al. 2016) 
In income minimization, the aim is to minimize the profit for the year, in line with the 
expectations of analysts and investors, in order to reduce it if it is too high compared to the 
target previously set (Beneish, 2001). This method allows the deferral of current income to a 
period of low profitability. Beneish (2001) mentions, however, that some advantage may result 
from these operations, such as lower taxes due to lower income. This is something Guenther 
(1994) investigates. He finds out that current accruals, which are defined as those types of 
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accruals that affect taxable income (Manzon, 1992; Choi et al. 1991), are positively related to 
debt levels but are not related to high level of manager ownership. 
Finally, following the definition given by Healy (1985), management might reduce the earnings 
by accelerating write-downs if it is obvious that – despite the accounting policy – earnings 
target will not be met. This is referred to as taking a bath. In this sense, managers tend to worsen 
the situation if the targets set by analysts and investors cannot be reached. Given that 
expectations will not, in any event, be honored, managers will have an incentive to “sacrifice a 
year” to get a better position in the next ones. The reason behind this is that the market punishes 
with a meter less severe an additional loss in a situation already below expectations (Jordan and 
Clark, 2004). Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) suggest that these practices – sometimes 
criticized by regulators – may be the natural responses on the part of a manager wishing to 
maximize the value of his company. 
The wide level of discretion associated with accrual makes it a potential choice for earnings 
management. It has also been proved that if managers are given lots of discretion, and the degree 
of verifiability is low, managers are more likely to practice accrual-based earnings management 
actions (Storå, 2013). Watts (2003) discovers that goodwill impairments are an item which is 
particularly prone to discretion, and lacks verifiability, due to which it can be used to manipulate 
earnings.   
3.4 Detecting earnings management 
It might be difficult for the management to identify earning management with certainty without 
knowing its true intentions. Hence, earnings management is criticized as it can simply occur 
due to a missing variable. Moreover, any other behavior might be regarded as earnings 
manipulation by mistake. (Gunny, 2005) Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find unexpectedly lots 
of minor (positive) earnings surprises and changes in earnings, which can be regarded as 
earnings manipulation actions to reach the thresholds set by investors and analysts. Other 
earnings management related studies have been inspired by these findings as these variables are 
commonly used to detect earnings management. As this paper focuses on accounting earnings 
management, different kinds of measures of discretionary accruals– that currently are state of 
art –  are briefly depicted. Accruals are regarded as the difference between net earnings and 
cash flows.  
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Healy model 
According to Healy (1985), there is always systematic earnings management. Earnings 
manipulation is detected as the mean of the total accruals (TAit) – used as a proxy for non-
discretionary accruals – scaled by the lagged total assets (Ait-1). As a proxy for non-discretionary 
accruals, the mean of the total accruals is used in this model. Given these, it is assumed that the 
total accruals deviating from zero are a sign of earnings manipulation. 
(1) 
 
The DeAngelo model 
DeAngelo (1986) assumes the difference between total accruals (TAit) and lagged total accruals 
(TAit-1) to be proxy for non-discretionary accruals. Given this, the discretionary accruals (DAit) 
is regarded as the non-discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets (Ait-1).  
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The Jones model 
Jones (1991) model assumes that changes in revenues cause changes in operating capital, thus 
causing a change in accruals as well. Gross property, plant and equipment (PPEit) are included 
to control portion of total accruals related to non-discretionary depreciations. The Jones model 
is formulated as follows: 
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Modified Jones model 
The modified Jones model was developed by Dechow et al. (1995) by adding one more item, 
that is, change in receivables, to calculate discretionary accruals. Thus, the modified Jones 
model is as follows:  
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3.5 Earnings management and goodwill 
Lots of studies find an association between earnings management and goodwill impairments 
(Miller and Shamsie, 2001; Gaines-Ross, 2002). For instance, Sevin and Schroeder (2005) find 
that firms, which impair goodwill in certain year, have substantially lower firm performance 
(ROA) compared to those which do not impair goodwill. Thereby, this provides evidence on 
big bath actions. As it turns out, goodwill impairment seems to be one the most important tools 
of earnings management (Caruso et al. 2016). The accounting literature of goodwill write-off 
is very wide and it often analyzes matters not deeply related to their root cause (Li et al. 2011; 
Hayn and Hughes, 2006; Francis et al. 1996; Anantharaman, 2007; Beatty and Weber, 2006). 
Instead, Gu and Lev (2011) give an important contribution to the debate by tracing goodwill 
write-offs all the way back to their root cause and by investigating the economic implications 
of goodwill impairment.  
According to Lhaopadchan (2010), the permanence of a goodwill impairment creates incentives 
for managers to postpone a goodwill impairment as this decline is reflected to the profits of that 
accounting period. Moreover, he adverts to that the incentives of management are the biggest 
factor to affect the write-off decisions. Dechow and Ge (2006) discover that management’s 
decision to impair goodwill is influenced by two motivations. First, management is willing to 
turn the firm around, and second, management wants to reorganize the company. Riedl (2004) 
and Henning et al. (2004) discover that due to the increase in discretion granted to managers 
regarding the timing of write-downs, managers can easily rationalize the reporting decisions as 
the standards permit this. Thus, a substantial problem exists due to the fact that standards give 
discretion to managers implying that earnings management actions are more likely to be 
engaged in (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Nelson et al. 2002). 
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The potential correlation between goodwill impairment and earnings management practices is 
justified by the fact that, as demonstrated by the application of IAS 36 in the previous section, 
there is considerable scope for discretion. This is more visible in absence of reliable information 
and in the process of valuing assets which are, by no means homogenous. In addition, other 
factors that increase the possibility of earnings management are: (a) the strong information 
asymmetry between management on the one hand, and shareholders and stakeholders on the 
other, and (b) the great discretion granted to managers, together with the fact that goodwill 
cannot be independently valued using fair value or value in use.  Because of its ability to 
produce effect – constant but variable over time – on accounting numbers, impairment test may 
result in significant volatility in the results. Due to the aforementioned reasons, goodwill 
impairment is a candidate to be the main tool for managers to affect accounting year-end 
valuations. (Caruso et al. 2016) 
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4. PRIOR RESEARCH  
 
Since 2005, many countries have been obliged to adopt the IFRS issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). IASB states that one of its main objectives is to enhance 
the transparency and comparability regarding financial reporting cross-nationally. As IFRS 
consists of financial reporting standards of high quality, it is considered to mitigate the 
discretion given to managers, and hence limit earnings management actions (Cai et al. 2008). 
On the other hand, it must be taken into consideration that IFRS standards permit a lot of 
discretion for managers regarding the goodwill. This is due to the fact that the management has 
the best knowledge of the financial position of the company. For instance, managers are given 
discretion when determining the CGUs. Moreover, fair values of certain assets are determined 
by the management. FASB states that the purpose of SFAS 142 is to enhance the value of 
goodwill in balance sheet, and hence provide the users of financial statements more relevant 
information and underlying assumptions regarding the changes in an entity’s assets over time. 
Given these, the purposes of the IFRS and SFAS are very similar. 
As it has been stated earlier, goodwill accounting – including goodwill impairments – has been 
under review for a substantial period of time. In this section, prior literature regarding the 
goodwill impairments as a tool of earnings management actions is depicted. However, it must 
be taken into account that the literature presented in this paper is not comprehensive yet it 
represents the studies that are the most interesting and relevant regarding the topic of this paper. 
Given this, the prior literature focuses on goodwill impairments used in earnings management 
actions, and the timeliness of goodwill impairments. The decision-making regarding the timing 
of a goodwill impairment gives lots of discretion for the managers under IFRS 3, IAS 36, and 
SFAS 142 as it has been mentioned earlier. This gives rise to assume that goodwill impairments 
can be used to manage earnings. Therefore, it is essential to represent prior literature regarding 
both the appropriate timing of goodwill impairments and goodwill impairments as a vehicle to 
manage earnings. Given the similarities between IFRS and SFAS, prior research under both 
IFRS and SFAS are included. First, the literature regarding the goodwill impairments as a tool 
of earnings management is presented. Second, an overview of literature related to timeliness of 
goodwill impairments is given. Even though this paper does not directly examine the timeliness 
of goodwill impairments in Finnish listed companies, it is important to include the literature in 
question as certain earnings management actions are directly related to the timeliness of 
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goodwill impairments. Given these, the prior literature has been selected so that it best serves 
the purpose of this paper.  
4.1 Goodwill impairments and earnings management actions 
As the discretion regarding the goodwill impairments has been subject to significant attention 
after the adoption of IFRS standards, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) examine this phenomenon in 
U.K. listed companies during years 2005–2006, having the total sample comprising 528 firm-
year observations. They examine, after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, whether management 
utilizes the discretion permitted by IFRS in regards to a decision to impair goodwill, and 
whether opportunistic reporting is reflected to this discretion. They control economic factors 
such as CEO change, the independency of board of directors, and ownership. As a result, they 
find that the management’s ability to report goodwill impairments are restricted by effective 
governance mechanisms. Thus, they find that IFRS 3 has enhanced the quality of goodwill 
impairments supporting the IASB’s contention that IFRS 3 does allow companies to reflect 
their underlying economic attributes. 
André et al. (2015) examine whether the adoption of IFRS has affected conditional 
conservatism. Conditional conservatism is defined as “the asymmetric recognition of gains and 
losses in earnings, and the value relevance of accounting earnings, measured as the ability of 
accounting earnings to summarize information impounded in market prices” (Brown et al. 
2006). Given this, conditional conservatism can be regarded as a requirement for firms to more 
sensitively report the bad news than good news. According to Watts (2003), conditional 
conservatism has become a more qualitative characteristic in financial reporting. However, as 
IFRS 3 allows lots of discretion to managers, financial reporting has not reached the level of 
quality IASB has intended (André et al. 2015). They examine 13,711 firm-year observations 
spanning from 2000–2010 in European firms (including Finland as well) – which adopted IFRS 
in 2005 – to review the pre and post levels of conditional conservatism. As two major crises 
(Internet bubble in the early 2000s and financial crisis 2008–2009) occurred during this period, 
it offers an eminently interesting field to examine the effect of asset impairments on conditional 
conservatism. André et al. (2015) document that the level of conditional conservatism has 
declined after the adoption of IFRS. Moreover, they allude to that this is presumably associated 
with the recognition and avoidance of asset impairment. According to André et al. (2015), the 
decline in the level of conditional conservatism is less likely to occur in firm which recognize 
asset impairments, and more likely to occur in firm which do not recognize an impairment even 
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though they ought to. Inappropriate enforcement of impairment tests and postponed 
impairments permit management to delay the bad news recognition regarding earnings thus 
reducing the level of conditional conservatism. 
Davis (2006) examines whether the impairment test of goodwill has improved the value 
relevance of goodwill accounting under SFAS. He represents two major, but opposing, 
problems regarding the SFAS 121 and SFAS 142 standards. First, forcing to amortize goodwill 
when firms, due to active and successful management, are actually enhancing the value of 
goodwill. Second, firms experiencing a substantial decline in goodwill might pursue hiding the 
decline by simply underestimating the real expense by recording the minimum amortization. 
The sample comprises 1,979 firm-year observations between years 1995–2002. Davis (2006) 
finds that companies were operating primarily under the rules in effect at the time (using both 
SFAS 121 and transitional SFAS 142) of the impairment measurement loss implying that they 
are not trying to game the system nor take a big bath. He concludes that even though firms are 
not appearing to use the new rules to their advantage, the sheer amount of write-downs ought 
to serve as an alarm that many managements either pay too much for their expansion or are 
unable to successfully integrate the target firm to acquiring one. 
Bisogno (2015) examines whether Italian listed companies manipulate earnings through 
goodwill accounting. His sample consists of 591 firm-year observations spanning from 2011–
2013, and modified Jones model is used to estimate the discretionary accruals. The results show 
that goodwill yearly changes are positively related to discretionary accruals supporting the 
assumption that IFRS 3 and IAS 36 provide managers wide discretion for both defining 
goodwill value as well as for the amount of goodwill subject to be written down. Accordingly, 
Bisogno (2015) suggests that IFRS 3 and, especially, IAS 36 induce managers to manipulate 
earnings. Furthermore, he also suggests that goodwill impairments offer earnings management 
opportunities, even though this accounting treatment (IAS 36) has been considered as a tool for 
reducing manager’s discretion by replacing the annual amortization. Alves (2013) investigates 
whether Portuguese listed firms use goodwill impairments to manage earnings. She uses both 
Jones (1991) and modified Jones model for the discretionary accruals, and – in addition to 
Bisogno’s (2015) research – she examines the effect of board size and auditor on the use of 
goodwill accounting to manage earnings. The sample comprises 198 firm-year observations 
during the years 2005–2010. Alves (2013) finds that goodwill impairments are significantly 
positively related to earnings management, suggesting that IAS 36 provides too wide discretion 
for managers regarding the goodwill write-offs. Moreover, she documents that having a 
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relatively bigger board and high cash flows decreases the earnings management actions whereas 
high leverage and political costs imply more earnings management actions. Haman and Jubb 
(2007) provide same kind of an examination on Australian firms. Using total sample of 343 
goodwill firms, their findings suggest that managers of goodwill firm use the opportunity of the 
adoption of IAS 36 to increase firm’s earnings by upwardly managing earnings using 
discretionary accruals and/or by lowering goodwill impairment losses.  
Earnings are defined as high-quality if they “provide(s) more information about the features of 
a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific 
decision-maker” (Dechow et al. 2010). Giacomino and Akers (2009) examine the effects of 
goodwill write-downs under SFAS 142 on earnings quality in 2008 and 2009. Prior to the 
research, they examined hundreds of financial statements, and discovered that most of these 
companies’ balance sheets (relative to total assets) have a substantial amount of goodwill. 
Moreover, the income statements of these companies reveal that goodwill impairments were 
somewhat frequent. Because of these results, further study on goodwill and goodwill 
impairments is thus needed. The sample of the study comprises Fortune 100 companies of 
which 10 had to be dismissed due to the lack of data available. However, 10 companies – in 
order of size – were added to get 100 companies. They calculate different kinds of ratios, such 
as the amount of goodwill to total assets, and the amount of goodwill to net income. Based on 
these ratios, they find that goodwill write-downs have augmented during 2008, and are likely 
to continue increasing into 2009. Furthermore, Giacomino and Akers (2009) allude to that since 
these companies have significant amounts of goodwill on their balance sheet at the end of fiscal 
year 2008, they are prone to big bath earnings management due to the uncertainty regarding the 
economy and the financial markets. 
Beatty and Weber (2006) find out whether the adoption of SFAS 142 has urged companies to 
impair goodwill under the line. Moreover, they have some economic incentives under review, 
which firms might encounter by selecting the accounting choice related to SFAS 142. 
According to them, the factors affecting the delay or acceleration of the impairment recognition 
are firm’s debt contracting, bonus, turnover, and exchange delisting incentives. They examine 
whether these factors affect the management’s decision to recognize the goodwill impairments 
above-the-line or below-the-line. “The line” refers to gross profit implying that those goodwill 
impairments could be recognized either to affect or not to affect the gross profit. In 2001 when 
SFAS 142 was adopted, both of these accounting treatments were allowed. SFAS 142 has 
permitted lots of discretion to managers regarding the accounting policy. First, management 
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may accelerate impairments to reach the “below-the line”. Second, management may postpone 
the impairment recognition with a hope of never having to recognize impairments. The sample 
data consists of 553 companies of which 232 recognize goodwill impairments. Beatty and 
Weber (2006) document that it is more probable for firms to impair goodwill if the firms gave 
greater net worth covenant slack and the covenant is affected by change in the accounting 
policy. In other words, when contracts include the effects of accounting changes, managers 
facing more binding contract are likely to postpone expense recognition. They also find that 
firms with earnings-contingent bonus systems are more likely to delay the recognition of 
goodwill impairments. These observations are consistent with the contractual incentives 
depicted in section 3.2.2. CEO tenures also seem to affect the impairment recognition decisions 
as firms having relatively longer tenures are less likely to recognize goodwill impairments. 
Furthermore, the companies with the goodwill impairment recognition leading to exchange 
delisting are more likely to delay the impairment recognition. On the other hand, companies 
facing high risks accelerate the goodwill impairment recognition. Condensed, it can be stated 
based on the study of Beatty and Weber (2006) that managerial incentives affected 
opportunistic way the recognition of goodwill during the transition of SFAS 142. 
Also the tenure of the CEO has been under examination regarding the goodwill impairments. 
Masters-Stout et al. (2008) examine what kind of an effect the tenure of CEOs in listed 
companies has on the decisions regarding goodwill write-downs as evidence supports the view 
that CEOs practice earnings management (Wells, 2002). Masters-Stout et al. (2008) uses OLS 
regression analysis on a sample of 990 firm-year observations of Fortune 500 companies during 
the years 2003–2005. They find that new CEOs are more likely to impair goodwill than senior 
CEOs. They allude to that new CEOs interpret the accounting rules differently implying that 
goodwill impairments might open a whole new window for earnings manipulation. Masters-
Stout et al. (2008) suggest that in order to assure the consistent application of the standard, the 
standard setters ought to focus the direction more on the valuation of goodwill impairment. 
Storå (2013) examines whether incentives regarding earnings targets are related to using 
goodwill impairments to manage earnings in IFRS-applying companies. The sample of the 
study comprises 2,743 firm-year observations spanning from 2005–2010. This sample consists 
of firms that apply IFRS, have reported goodwill on their balance sheets, and have recorded 
goodwill impairment during the year. Moreover, all financial institutions and public 
administration entities are excluded from the sample. He uses regression analysis in two 
perspectives: upwards earnings management, and downwards earnings management. Storå 
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(2013) finds that firms avoid goodwill impairments because of which they would not reach 
earnings targets. He ponders whether the regulation ought to be changed due to the earnings 
manipulation. Furthermore, he even suggests returning to the prior straight-line amortization 
method as this would decrease the discretion regarding the goodwill impairments. 
Henning et al. (2004) examine the criticism towards U.S. GAAP that it would have permitted 
too wide discretion in regards to determining the timing and amount of goodwill write-downs. 
The sample of the study consists of both U.S. and U.K. firms with 1,576 and 563 firm-year 
observations respectively. The results demonstrate that, before SFAS 142, firms managed 
strategically the amount of goodwill write-downs. Moreover, they find that firms in the U.S. 
delay goodwill write-downs thus avoiding the income-reducing effects, and firms in the U.K. 
manage the timing of goodwill impairments to avoid agency costs. Their results also suggest 
that SFAS 142 mandating annual impairments tests is likely to decrease the firms’ ability to 
delay goodwill write-offs. 
There are also studies which focus on big bath earnings management as it has been discussed 
in section 3. Big bath refers to actions in which there is a tendency to worsen the current 
situation if it is not possible to reach the target set by analysts/investors. Given that expectations 
will not, in any event, be honored, managers will have an incentive to “sacrifice a year” to get 
a better position in the next ones. According to Jordan and Clark (2004), market punishes with 
a meter less severe and additional loss in a situation already below expectations. They examine 
Fortune 100 companies during the years 2001–2002 (the adoption of SFAS 142) and find that 
firms practice big bath earnings management in the adoption year of SFAS 142. 
Sevin and Schroeder (2005) investigate whether the provisions of SFAS 142 permit the big bath 
earnings management actions, and whether firm size is associated with earnings management. 
The sample of the study comprises 202 companies of which 120 reported goodwill impairments 
in 2002. These companies were classified into two groups according to total assets. Sevin and 
Schroeder (2005) find that, in 2002, sample firms wrote off a substantial amount of goodwill 
reported on balance sheet in 2001. Large companies recognized a goodwill impairment of 27 
percent of 2001 goodwill, whereas small firms recognized an impairment of 73 percent of 2001 
goodwill. This suggests that smaller companies might have been disproportionately impacted 
by the implementation of SFAS 142. Thus, substantially greater proportion of small firms 
reported negative earnings in the year of adopting SFAS 142, as opposed to the prior year, but 
there was no significant difference between the year-to-year proportions of large firms reporting 
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negative earnings. These results suggest that the negative effect of reporting – following the 
adoption of SFAS 142 – was utilized by relatively smaller companies with a strive for engaging 
in big bath behavior.  
Riedl (2004) examines the effect of SFAS 121, that is, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-
Lived Assets, on the characteristics of reported asset write-offs pre and post SFAS 121 
implementation. The sample consists of 2,754 firm-year observations spanning from 1992–
1998, and financial institutions were excluded. The results show that the underlying economics 
of the firm have a weaker mapping into write-offs reported under SFAS 121. Furthermore, the 
results indicate that managers are using greater flexibility after the adoption of SFAS 121 than 
before. This indicates that managers act more in a way of big bath actions. However, one must 
take into account that there could be two reasons for this. First, managers might be distorting 
the underlying economic factors their company is facing, and thus reporting opportunistically. 
Second, managers may be using more flexibility in an attempt to overcome some deficiency in 
the reporting of write-downs under SFAS by providing a signal that reflects the firm 
performance in a more meaningful manner. 
Also the analysts’ and auditors’ perceptions as well as the effect of audit quality has been taken 
into account in goodwill impairment studies related to earnings management. Saastamoinen et 
al. (2013) explore the perceptions of financial analysts on the accounting for goodwill in 
accordance with IFRS. The sample consists of a questionnaire sent to financial analysts in 
Nordic countries and in Austria in October 2012 – March 2013. In overall, the sample comprises 
95 respondents from the analysts. According to the results, analysts expect management to 
carefully consider the impairment decisions. Over a half of the analysts shares the view that 
goodwill accounting under IFRS enables earnings management actions. Moreover, almost a 
half of the analysts think that these rules actually lead to increased earnings management. 
Almost three quarters of the analysts believes that companies are avoiding goodwill impairment 
recognitions. The results indicate two kinds of perceptions: first, analysts think that goodwill 
impairment decisions are driven by managerial discretion and opportunism. The second line of 
thought states that IFRS regulation enhances financial information about goodwill.  
Saastamoinen and Pajunen (2013) explore auditors’ perceptions of goodwill accounting under 
IFRS. The study is conducted by sending a survey to 523 KHT-certified (CPA) Finnish auditors 
yielding an amount of responses of 123. Based on the results, it seems that more experienced 
auditors who have audited publicly quoted companies share the view that goodwill impairments 
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are not recognized although they should be. The auditors with a recently received KHT (CPA) 
degree believe that management compensation plan affects the decision to impair goodwill. 
According to the results, on the one hand, auditors believe that managers act opportunistically 
regarding the decisions to impair goodwill. On the other hand, Big 4 auditors favor goodwill 
accounting under IFRS. All of these prior research related to goodwill impairments as a tool of 
earnings management are presented in table 1. 
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Table 1. Prior research on goodwill impairments as a tool of earnings management
Researchers Publication and year Research question Data used Results 
AbuGhazaleh, N.M, 
Al-Hares, O.M. & 
Roberts, C. 
Journal of International  
Financial Management &  
Accounting, 2011 
Do managers use discretion regarding goodwill 
impairments after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS 3, and is this reflected to opportunistic 
reporting? 
528 firm-year observations in U.K. listed firms 
during 2005–2006. 
Managers use discretion when determining goodwill impairments. However, results 
suggest that managers use discretion to convey their expectations and private 
information. Accordingly, managers do not act opportunistically. 
Alves, S. Journal of Accounting,  
Business & Management,  
2013 
Are goodwill impairments used to manipulate 
earnings? 
33 Portuguese publicly quoted firms during the 
years 2005–2010. 
Goodwill impairments are used to manipulate earnings. First, earnings management 
is less likely to occur when board size is large and cash flows high. Second, 
earnings are manipulated more when the firm is large and more indebted. 
André, P., Filip, A. 
& Paugam, L. 
Journal of Business Finance  
& Accounting, 2015 
The effect of impairment recognition and 
avoidance on the level of unconditional 
conservatism after the adoption of IFRS. 
A sample of 16 European firms comprising 
13,711 firm-year observations spanning from 
2000–2008. 
The decrease in unconditional conservatism is related to asset impairment 
recognition and avoidance. This decrease is less likely for firms that recognize an 
asset impairment and more likely for firms that do not book an asset impairment. 
Beatty, A. & Weber,  
J. 
Journal of Accounting  
Research, 2006 
Factors affecting above-the-line and below- 
the-line goodwill impairments. 
553 companies which are relatively more likely to 
recognize goodwill impairments. 
Firms with equity market expectations are associated with above-the-line 
accounting choices, and firms with covenants and bonus plans are related to below-
the-line accounting choices. 
Bisogno, M. Journal of Management & 
Development, 2015 
Are goodwill impairments used to manipulate 
earnings? 
197 Italian listed companies; 591 firm-year 
observations spanning from 2011– 2013.  
IFRS has induced managers to deliberately manipulate earnings. Goodwill 
impairments are associated with earnings management actions. 
Davis, M. Journal of American  
Academy of Business,  
Cambridge, 2006 
Has the impairment test solved problems 
regarding goodwill? 
1,979 firms that reported goodwill write-offs 
during 1995–2002.  
The transition to testing goodwill for impairment has enhanced the situation. 
However, it has also enabled companies to engage in big bath actions. 
Giacomino, D.E. & 
Akers, M.D. 
Journal of Business &  
Economics Research, 2009 
How do the goodwill impairments affect earnings 
quality? 
Fortunate 100 companies in 2008 and 2009. Goodwill impairments were used as a big bath action in 2009. Thus, goodwill 
impairments have a significant effect on earnings quality. 
Haman, J. & Jubb, 
C. 
Working paper, Monash  
University 
Do managers use discretion to manipulate 
earnings? 
343 Australian firms 2005–2007.  Managers use discretion by delaying goodwill impairments. 
Henning, S.L., 
Shaw, W.H. & 
Stock, T. 
Review of Quantitative  
Finance and Accounting,  
2004 
Regarding the timing and amount of goodwill 
write-downs, do managers use discretion too 
widely? 
1,567 U.S. And 563 U.K. Acquisitions during 
1990–1994. 
U.S. firms delayed goodwill write-downs, and U.K. firms timed write-downs to 
avoid agency costs. 
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Researchers Publication and year Research question Data used Results 
Jordan, C.E. & Clark, S.J. Journal of Applied Busi- 
ness Research, 2004 
 
Are goodwill impairments associated with big 
bath actions? 
Fortune 100 companies in years 2001 and 2002. In the adoption year of SFAS 142, firms used goodwill impairments to take a bath. 
Masters-Stout, B., 
Costigan, M.L. & 
Lovata, L.M. 
Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 2008 
Does the tenure of CEOs affect goodwill 
impairment decisions? 
Fortune 500 companies during years 2003–2005. New CEOs are more likely to impair goodwill than their senior counterparts. 
Riedl, E.J. The Accounting 
Review, 2004 
The associations between write-down amount and 
economic factors, and write-down amount and 
reporting incentives. Do they differ? 
2,754 firm-year observations during years 1992–
1998. 
Reporting regarding big bath incentives is strongly associated with write-downs.  
Saastamoinen, J. & 
Pajunen, K. & Ojala, H. 
Working paper, 2013 What are the perceptions of financial analysts 
regarding goodwill accounting? 
Survey questionnaire to financial analysts in 
Nordic countries and in Austria in October 2012 
- March 2013. 45 responses were received. 
First, the decision to impair goodwill is affected by discretion granted to 
management. Second, IFRS regulation improves goodwill-based financial 
information. 
Saastamoinen, J. & 
Pajunen, K. 
Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 2013 
What are the perceptions of auditors regarding 
IFRS-based goodwill accounting? 
Electronic questionnaire to KHT certified 
Finnish auditors with 123 responses. 
Managers act opportunistically regarding the impairment decision, but auditors 
reacted also favorably towards IFRS-based goodwill accounting. 
Sevin, S. & Schroeder, 
R. 
Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 2005 
Does SFAS 142 enable big bath actions? A random selection of companies with 
December 31, 2002 fiscal year-ends with 202 
firms. 
SFAS 142 allows companies to take a bath. Especially, big bath actions are taken by 
smaller firms. 
Storå, J. Hanken School of 
Economics, 2013 
Are earnings manipulated through goodwill 
impairments? 
A sample of 2,743 observations during years  
2005–2010. 
Goodwill impairments are avoided if earnings roughly exceed the target. Moreover, 
earnings are managed downwards if earnings evidently exceed or fall short of the 
target. 
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4.2 Timeliness of goodwill impairments 
IAS 36 changes drastically the timeliness of impairment test and its mechanics. Impairment-
approach should be more explicit compared to straight-line basis on the following issues: (1) 
when to test for impairment, (2) what level of CGU to test; and (3) how to determine the amount 
of impairment. IAS 36 requires goodwill to be tested for impairment annually and under certain 
circumstances. Under IAS 36, an impairment test ought to be conducted same time annually. 
This is due to the fact that an impairment test cannot be timed in a way that it could affect the 
results. As it has been already discussed, IAS 36 (as well as SFAS 142) permit managers to use 
discretion determining the timely of goodwill impairment decisions, which is an essential part 
of earnings management practices. 
Following the adoption of new standards (both IAS 36 and SFAS 142), it was expected that the 
adoption of those standards would lead to improved timeliness of goodwill impairment 
recognition. Chen et al. (2008) examine whether firms, which reported goodwill impairments 
in the adoption year of SFAS 142, enhanced their timeliness of goodwill impairment 
recognitions. The sample of the study comprises 1,763 firms of which 726 report goodwill 
impairments. Their findings give support to the objectives of the standards (both IAS 36 and 
SFAS 142): goodwill amortization lacks timeliness as is captured by the relation between prior 
returns and adoption impairments in regression model 1. In addition, the current standards seem 
to represent timelier information on goodwill impairments. Despite the enhancement of the 
timeliness, their findings suggest that timeliness of goodwill impairments can still be enhanced. 
Jarva (2009) examines goodwill impairments under SFAS 142 focusing on whether these are 
associated with the expected future cash flows. His sample comprises firms listed on NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ on the condition that they report goodwill impairments between 2002 
and 2005. He discovers that one and two-year-ahead expected cash flows can be predicted by 
goodwill impairments. This implies that – on average – goodwill impairments are closely 
associated with economic factors rather than management’s behavior. Jarva (2009) also pursues 
examining a sample of non-impairment firms in the light of having evidence on avoidance of 
goodwill impairments. However, he does not find convincing evidence that these firms would 
be avoiding goodwill impairments on purpose. Ji (2013) finds evidence that Australian firms 
applying IFRS are avoiding goodwill impairments particularly if the impairments affected 
substantially the reporting entities’ earnings. 
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Also the triggering events of goodwill impairments have been under examination. Comiskey 
and Mulford (2010) examine what kinds of triggering events firms face prior to goodwill 
impairment decision, and whether managers use discretion regarding the impairment decision. 
Their search for finding triggering events focuses on annual Form 10-K filings recently 
(recently as of 2010) filed in to the SEC by US firms. In these filings, the firms under 
examination report the triggering events concerning the goodwill impairments. Comiskey and 
Mulford (2010) select the firms with certain keywords, and listed all the triggering events 
different from each other. The final sample comprises approximately 150 firms. The results 
show that the Top 5 triggering events were: (1) decreases in the market value, (2) increases in 
competition, (3) adverse legal or regulatory developments, (4) decreases in performance or 
failing to meet the expectations, and (5) decreases in economic conditions. Despite the wide 
gamut of various types of triggering events, the management seems to deny the need for the 
impairment in several cases. Condensed, the management seems to be more optimistic than 
probably ought to be, thus deciding not to recognize goodwill impairments. For example, even 
though the stock is trading below its book value, the management denies the triggering event 
as the long-term fundamentals of the company’s business have not changed. Based on the 
results, Comiskey and Mulford (2010) conclude that the judgmental discretion permitted to 
management affects substantially the goodwill impairment decisions. Also Li and Sloan (2009) 
confirm this by finding out that goodwill impairments seem to be high when pre-goodwill 
impairment operating margins are low. They also document that the carrying amounts of 
goodwill differ substantially from the fair values, implying that – taken these together – 
management tends to delay goodwill impairments. 
Jahmani et al. (2010) examine goodwill impairments as an income smoothing tool, and their 
focus is on the management’s decision making. More specifically, they examine whether the 
management deliberately times a goodwill impairment to smoothen the earnings of the 
accounting period. The sample comprises 200 SFAS 142 applying companies, observations 
spanning from years 2003–2005. Jahmani et al. (2010) require the companies to have goodwill 
on their balance sheets. These companies are selected randomly from different sectors. 
However, due to the lack of information concerning the goodwill, only 117 companies were 
selected for the final examination. Jahmani et al. (2010) assume that companies reporting losses 
for the accounting period also recognize a goodwill impairment. They find out that companies 
reporting losses for three consecutive years seem to avoid goodwill impairments. Moreover, 
they categorize companies into three classes based on whether they report return on assets 
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(ROA) of 2 % or less for three consecutive years, for two years, and for one year. Jahmani et 
al. (2010) presume companies reporting ROA of 2 % or less for three consecutive years to have 
recognized a goodwill impairment. Furthermore, they assume companies which have relatively 
low ROA for two years to have impaired capital, but they did not recognize any goodwill 
impairment. This implies that these companies delay goodwill impairments to subsequent 
period when earnings are anticipated to be higher. 
Ramanna and Watts (2009) are interested in the proxies that are associated with goodwill non-
impairments under SFAS 142. They examine whether the non-impairments are related to the 
proxies for management’s inside information on positive future cash flows or agency-based 
motives. They only examine firms with goodwill, and if the market value of equity is bigger 
than the book value. Using these requirements, their sample comprises 124 firm-year 
observations during the years 2003–2006. By applying several regression models they find no 
evidence that the non-impairments would be associated with the management’s inside 
information on future cash flows. However, Ramanna and Watts (2009) do find some evidence 
on delaying or avoiding goodwill impairments if these affected CEO compensation, CEO 
reputation, or debt-covenants. 
Ojala (2007) examines the timeliness of goodwill impairments in the U.S. firms, and whether 
these impairments provide timely information for investors. With a sample of 605 firm-year 
observations spanning from years 2001–2006, he uses OLS regression analysis to find out 
whether goodwill impairments are associated with the rate of lagged returns of the firms’ stocks. 
As a result, Ojala (2007) documents that the U.S. firms delay goodwill impairments with one 
or two years on average as the reported goodwill impairments – on average – lag behind the 
economic impairment of goodwill. This suggests that the goodwill impairments do not yield 
timely information to investors. 
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Table 2. Prior research on the timeliness of goodwill impairments. 
Researchers Publication and year Research question Data used Results 
Chen, C., Kohlbeck, M. 
& Warfield, T. 
Advances in  
Accounting, 2008 
How has SFAS 142 affected the timeliness of 
goodwill impairments? 
1,763 of which 726 firms reported goodwill 
impairments. 
SFAS 142 has substantially improved the timeliness of goodwill impairment 
recognitions. 
Comiskey, E. & 
Mulford, C. 
Managerial Finance,  
2010 
Do certain events trigger goodwill impairments? 
Does management avoid the timing of a 
goodwill impairment? 
 
150 public firms were selected from the Form 
10K filings made to SEC. 
There are various different kinds of triggering events in significance and severity. 
Managers' estimate requires a great judgmental discretion due to which these 
estimates might be altered to avoid goodwill impairments. 
Jahmani, Y., &  
Dowling, W.A.  Torres, 
P.D. 
Journal of Business &  
Economics Research,  
2010 
Does management deliberately select the timing 
of goodwill impairment recognition to smooth 
the company's earnings? 
A sample of 200 companies was pruned due to 
lack of information on goodwill. The final sample 
consisted of 117 companies in years 2003–2005. 
SFAS No. 142 provides an opportunity for management to manipulate reported 
earnings. Most of the companies attempt to manage the volatility of earnings by 
avoiding taking impairment losses. 
Jarva, H. Journal of Business  
Finance & Accounting,  
2009 
Are goodwill impairments associated with 
expected future cash flows? Are U.S. firms 
avoiding goodwill impairments? 
U.S. firms that report goodwill impairments 
during 2002–2005; non-impairment U.S. firms. 
Goodwill impairments are associated with expected future cash flows, but he finds 
no evidence that non-impairment firms would be avoiding recognition of goodwill 
impairments. 
Ji, K. Australian Accounting  
Review, 2013 
Are companies delaying or avoiding goodwill 
impairments even though they ought to recognize 
an impairment? 
77 companies during year 2007–2009; 231 firm-
year observations. 
Companies delay and avoid goodwill impairment recognitions. The impairments 
were more likely to be delayed or avoided if those impairments had had a 
substantial effect on earnings. 
Li, K. & Sloan, R. Working Paper, 2009 To examine the effect of SFAS 142 on goodwill 
accounting. 
329 firm-year observations spanning from 1996–
2001. 
The transition to SFAS 142 has led to delaying goodwill impairments, and that the 
carrying amounts differ substantially from the fair values. 
Ojala, H. Doctoral dissertation,  
Helsinki School of  
Economics, 2007 
To examine the timeliness of goodwill 
impairments under SFAS 142. 
605 firm-year observations in U.S. firms spanning 
from years 2001–2006. 
Goodwill is not impaired timely in U.S. companies. Therefore, goodwill 
impairments do not yield timely information to investors. 
Ramanna, K. & Watts, 
R. 
Working Paper, 2009 To examine the proxies associated with the 
goodwill impairments. 
124 firm-year observations spanning from years 
2003–2006 including firms whose market value 
exceeds book value, and which have goodwill 
worth over $1m. 
Goodwill impairments are associated with agency-based proxies to some extent, but 
not with management's private information on positive future cash flows. 
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5. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter, the hypotheses of this paper are formulated. Prior to this, theory-based 
frameworks for these hypotheses are provided. Even though IFRS standards are the same in 
different countries, it is worthwhile to take into consideration that reporting environments can 
vary substantially from each other. Therefore, for the first hypothesis, Finnish reporting 
environment with its main principles is depicted first, after which the background of second 
hypothesis is given.   
5.1 IFRS in Finnish reporting environment 
From the beginning of accounting period of 2005, all European listed companies were to adopt 
IFRS in order to compile their consolidated financial statements. IFRS were adopted due to the 
fact that one set of high-quality standards would guarantee a high level of comparability and 
transparency of financial information. Higher quality financial reporting enhances stock market 
liquidity and reduces the cost of capital. However, Nobes (2008) points out that the adoption of 
these standards does not ensure complete international comparability as the IFRS will not be 
applied in the same way everywhere. For example, Kvaal and Nobes (2010) examine five 
countries in the adoption year, and find out that no complete international comparability of 
financial information is yet accomplished. 
In the beginning of the new millennium, IFRS were not a totally new issue in Finnish 
accounting environment. The transition to IFRS-based accounting changed, however, the 
previous Finnish accounting as the adoption of IFRS introduced many new issues into 
accounting which differ from the Finnish Accounting Act. In IFRS, the significance of balance 
sheet is more important compared to the traditional Finnish accounting, which emphasizes the 
importance of income statement. Until this point, the emphasis was on how the profit or loss 
comprises, and the value of assets was not considered as important as the profit and loss 
statement. (Pajunen, 2010) Traditionally, the use of fair value has not been typical in Finnish 
accounting, which is totally opposite to IFRS. In Finnish accounting, the prudence has 
traditionally been an important aspect of financial reporting. Virtanen (2009) argues that despite 
the adoption of IFRS, prudence is still an important aspect in Finnish accounting as well as in 
connection with accounting and taxation, even though these aspects differ from the point of 
view of IFRS. 
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Prior to the adoption of IFRS, goodwill was amortized according to plan in 5–10 years. Even 
though the straight-line basis ought not to be under the target of management’s discretion, this 
is not the whole truth. Finnish Accounting Act permits goodwill to be amortized not later than 
20 years. This implies that the management might have used goodwill impairments to manage 
earnings prior to the IFRS-adoption as well. For instance, a company can amortize goodwill in 
20 years to manipulate the earnings, thus avoiding the negative effects on management 
compensation as long as the company explains the reason in the notes. In the light of IFRS, 
IFRS requires conditional conservatism which “is the greater aggressiveness in the recognition 
of bad news than in the recognition of good news” (André et al. 2015). Compared to the prior 
straight-line basis, IAS 36 requires to test goodwill at least annually for the possible impairment, 
or whenever there are indications of impairments. André et al. (2015), however, state that the 
wide discretion allowed by IFRS might have actually prevented IASB to reach the target it has 
set for financial reporting. Furthermore, some argue that IFRS is less prudent compared to 
national GAAP for the following reasons. First, there is no such concept as ‘prudence’ 
mentioned in the conceptual framework. Second, IFRS allows several fair value alternatives 
that are imprudent. (André et al. 2015) 
As the prior literature demonstrates, goodwill impairments are used very often in different 
forms to manipulate the earnings. The various types of earnings management incentives have 
been discussed in more detail in section 3. Even though IFRS is expected to constrain managers’ 
discretion to manage earnings by removing many allowable accounting policies, it must be 
taken into consideration that IFRS 3 and IAS 36 provide a substantial gamut of discretion to 
the management. Regarding IFRS 3, managers might, for example, select to use a small 
discount rate when determining the CGUs, which means that they could thus avoid recognizing 
a goodwill impairment. 
Having given aforementioned arguments, the first hypothesis is posited as following: 
H1: Goodwill impairments are associated with earnings management actions in Finnish 
listed companies during 2005–2014. 
5.2 Financial crisis 
According to a wide gamut of accounting literature, earnings management motivations shall be 
enumerated as follows: motivations related to market, and motivations arising from agency 
relationships (Filip and Raffournier, 2014). Regarding the market influence, some research 
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document that companies practice upwards earnings management in order to avoid losses, any 
declines in earnings, or negative earnings surprises (see Ayers et al. 2006; Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997). As the prior literature illustrates (see section 4), firms also manipulate earnings 
due to earnings-based compensation and debt covenants. 
The financial crisis had substantial effects in Europe. It began in the U.S. market in mid-2007, 
but its effects became more prevalent across the globe from the second quarter of 2008 (Mollik 
et al. 2013). As it can be seen in Figure 4, the annual growth rate of GDP in Finland exceeded 
the annual growth rate of Euro area prior to the financial crisis. From 2003 to 2007, the growth 
rate of GDP ameliorated steadily both in Finland and in Euro area. After this, it decreased 
somewhat moderately until 2008, after which it sagged. The impacts of the financial crisis were 
substantially more disquieting in Finland in 2009 than in Euro area on average. The GDP in 
Euro area and Finland fell 4.5 % and 8.3 % respectively. 
 
Figure 4. Annual GDP growth rates 
Source: World Bank 
Earnings management actions can be reflected to financial crisis years as well. There are some 
reasons to assume that earnings manipulation would occur less likely during financial crisis 
years. First, stakeholders and auditors monitor companies more carefully during the crisis years 
(Chia et al. 2007). In other words, managers would have less discretion to manage earnings 
when under surveillance. Furthermore, companies are subject to litigation risks during crisis 
periods, when markets face sharp drops (Filip and Raffournier, 2014). Therefore, managers 
ought to respond to these risk by controlling earnings management actions.  
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Second, lower earnings manipulation actions might exist due to a demand for lower earnings 
during recession periods (Filip and Raffournier, 2014). This is rationalized as reported earnings 
during these periods are less persistent, and hence do not reflect future predictions. Consistent 
with this, Brown et al. (2006) document that the value relevance of earnings varies depending 
on the business cycle. As a result, due to the uncertainty regarding future outcomes, market 
demands lower earnings during crisis periods.  
Filip and Raffournier (2014) examine how macroeconomic conditions affect earnings 
manipulation in 16 European countries. They discover that firms are less likely to manage 
earnings during the crisis years. Furthermore, Cimini (2015) investigates whether and how the 
misrepresentation regarding financial information is affected by the financial crisis. By 
analyzing 11,844 firm-year observations, he documents a decrease in the misrepresentation of 
financial statements in the vast majority in Europe.  
Based on these aforementioned arguments and results of prior studies, the second hypothesis 
(presented in the form of null hypothesis) is formulated as follows: 
H2: During the financial crisis years, goodwill impairments are not associated with 
earnings management actions. 
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6. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This chapter represents the data and estimation models used in this paper. A thorough insight 
is given about how the data are collected and final sample formed as well as how the hypotheses 
of this paper are tested. 
6.1 Data 
This paper examines whether goodwill impairments have been subject to earnings manipulation 
in Finnish listed companies during the years 2005–2014. The data are collected from Thomson 
Reuters database. First, the data are gathered for all OMX Helsinki listed companies during the 
years 2000–2014 to examine whether the amount of goodwill amortizations recognized prior 
to the adoption of IFRS differ substantially from goodwill impairments. This yielded 4,230 
firm-year observations. After this, all the firm-year observations are deleted for which there 
was not the following data available: cash flow from operations; net income; revenues; 
property, plant and equipment; total assets; accounts receivable; goodwill; total debt to total 
equity; or ROA. Finally, all the firm-year observations until 2005 are deleted, and those firm-
year observations in 2005 for which the needed ratios could not be calculated due to lack of 
data in 2004. In this research, banks and financial institutions are excluded from the sample. 
Even if these applied IFRS, they are subject to specific reporting regulations. Furthermore, the 
empirical models, which detect earnings management actions, have not been developed for the 
financial industry (Filip and Raffournier, 2014). However, not a single financial institution 
observation had to be deleted as they were eliminated because of the criteria set for the sample. 
Hence, the final sample of this paper comprises 899 firm-year observations spanning from years 
2005–2014. The formation of the final sample is depicted in table 3. 
Table 3. The final sample 
Criterion             
1. Firm-year observations in OMX Helsinki during 2000–2014   4,230 
2. Firm-year observations for which there were no needed data available  -2,789 
3. Firm-year observation spanning from year 2000–2004  -452 
4. Firm-year observations for which could not be calculated needed ratios for year 2005  
due to lack of data in 2004         -90 
Final sample      899 
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6.2 Estimation model and variables 
Jones (1991) defines the accruals as a function of revenues growth, and property, plant and 
equipment (PPE). However, the explanatory power of Jones model is quite low – approximately 
10 % – even though it manages to confirm the correlation between accruals and firm attributes 
(Dechow et al. 2010). They suggest that the considerable discretion permitted to managers 
might explain the low explanatory power of Jones model. As briefly discussed in section 3.5, 
Dechow et al. (1995) present the Jones model which adjusts the growth in credit sales. They 
elaborate that credit sales are vulnerable to manipulation due to which the modification 
ameliorates the explanatory power, yielding a residual which is not correlated with normal, 
revenue accruals. Hence, the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) detects better revenue 
manipulation.  
From the different methodologies adopted in discovering earnings manipulation, the modified 
Jones model is adopted to consider the discretionary components of total accruals as a measure 
of financial statements’ reliability. This is due to the fact that the modified Jones model provides 
the most powerful tests regarding earnings management actions (Dechow et al. 1995). 
Moreover, Dechow et al. (2010) suggest that the modified Jones model enhances the 
explanatory power of regression. Alves (2013) states that accruals are likely to be affected by 
goodwill impairment losses, which would reduce the reported earnings with no effect on the 
cash flow from operation, thus providing significant scope for earnings management actions. 
By using income statement and balance sheet items, total accruals (TAC) are expressed as the 
difference between net income (NI) and cash flows from operations (CFO). 
 TAC = NI – CFO  (5) 
Furthermore, total accruals (TAC) can be divided into discretionary (DAC) and non-
discretionary (NDAC) accruals. Hence: 
 TAC = DAC + NDAC (6) 
 
In this paper, the modified Jones model developed by Dechow et al. (1995) is adopted. This 
model assumes that revenues are discretionary accruals as well. However, the model is slightly 
modified further. Kasznik (1999) includes the yearly changes in cash flow from operations to 
the modified Jones model, which, according to Siregar and Utama (2008), improves detecting 
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earnings management actions, and provides a high R2. Thus, the estimation model used is as 
follows: 
 
 (7) 
 
where, i and t denote the company and the year respectively. TAC is total accruals, ∆REV is the 
change in revenues, ∆REC is the change in account receivables, PPE is property, plant and 
equipment; ∆PPE is the change in property, plant and equipment; ∆CF is the change in cash 
flow from operations, TA is total assets, and ɛ is the residual term. The variable on the left-hand 
side is the dependent variable, and the variables on the right-hand side are independent 
variables. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is used to first estimate the 
discretionary accruals, which goodwill impairments are a part of as stated throughout this paper. 
However, the results of the OLS regression regarding the estimation of discretionary accruals 
are not tabulated. 
Changes in working capital – such as account receivables, inventory and account payables – 
are included in total accruals, and they all are are influenced by changes in sales (∆REV). Jones 
(1991) states that property, plant and equipment as well as changes in sales are included to 
control the changes in non-discretionary accruals caused by altered conditions. Revenues can 
be regarded as a rationale and objective measure of the firm’s operations before management’s 
manipulation actions, even though they cannot be regarded as completely exogenous. Thus, 
revenues are included to control the economic environment of the company. The purpose of 
gross property, plant and equipment (PPEit) is to control the part of total accruals related to 
non-discretionary depreciation expenses. Mariani et al. (2010) suggest to include also yearly 
changes in PPE as these reduce potential biases, even though PPEit itself is a significantly 
explicative variable. Finally, all the variables in the model are deflated by the lagged value of 
total assets as this reduces heteroscedasticity (Piot and Janin, 2007). 
The variables of the modified Jones model are divided into non-discretionary accruals and 
discretionary accruals. As these form total accruals, discretionary accruals can be seen as 
unexplained components of total accruals, that is, the residual term ɛit.  
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(8) 
 
6.2.1 OLS regression 
The value of discretionary accruals (ɛit) is used as a proxy for earnings management. Negative 
sign of discretionary accruals implies that firm has engaged in income-decreasing earnings 
management actions whereas positive sign that firm has manipulated earnings upwards by using 
accruals. After having estimated the discretionary accruals, another regression analysis (OLS) 
is performed to test the hypotheses. As prior literature suggests, goodwill impairments are not 
the only factor influencing earnings management actions, but also leverage, political costs 
(size), cash flow from operations, and performance (ROA) affect earnings management. This 
is mainly the same model Bisogno (2015) uses, but some modifications are done. Instead of 
using yearly changes in goodwill, these changes are divided into four components. In addition, 
in order to take the effects of financial crisis into account, a dummy variable is included to 
control these effects. Given these assumptions, the hypotheses are tested as follows: 
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where, 
ɛit The value of discretionary accruals in company i in year t 
GW_IMPit Dummy variable; coded to 1 if company i has impaired goodwill in year t, and 0 otherwise 
IMPAIRit The amount of goodwill impairment company i has recorded in year t 
GW_INCit Dummy variable; coded to 1 if goodwill has increased in company i in year t, and 0 
otherwise 
INCit The amount of increase in goodwill for company i in year t 
LEVit Total debt to total assets of the company i in year t 
SIZEit Natural logarithm of the total assets in company i in year t 
CFit Cash flow from operations in company i in year t 
ROAit Return on assets for firm i in year t 
lnTACit Natural logarithm of total accruals in company i in year t 
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FCi Dummy variable; coded to 1 if company i has recognized a goodwill impairment in year 
2008–2009, and 0 otherwise 
eit Error term for company i in year t  
 
In the model, the dependent variable is the value of discretionary accruals estimated in the 
modified Jones model, and all other variables are independent variables. Yearly changes in 
goodwill have been divided into four factors. On the one hand, it is separated whether a firm 
impairs goodwill in certain year or not (GW_IMPit), and what the amount of the impairment 
(IMPAIRit) is. As goodwill impairments are assumed to be used to manage earnings through the 
accruals, the decisions to impair goodwill are expected to increase when the earnings have been 
managed downwards, that is, the discretionary accruals are negative. Hence, GW_IMPit is 
expected to be negatively associated with the dependent variable, that is, the discretionary 
accruals. Similarly, as the earnings have been managed downwards, it is assumed to be done 
by using goodwill impairments. Since the amounts of goodwill impairments are modeled as 
negative values, IMPAIRit is expected to be positively associated with the dependent variable. 
On the other hand, it is examined whether the amount of goodwill has increased or not 
(GW_INCit), and what the amount of increase in goodwill (INCit) is. Obviously, if the earnings 
have been managed downwards, it not expected that goodwill increases. Given this assumption, 
these variables are expected to be positively associated with the dependent variable.  
Leverage (LEVit) is measured with the ratio total debt to total assets. As it has already been 
discussed in this paper, firms with higher leverage seem to be more prone to manage earnings 
downwards (Alves, 2013). Given this, the leverage is assumed to have a negative association 
with earnings management actions, that is, discretionary accruals. SIZEit is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the total assets. Burgstahler et al. (2006) find that relatively smaller firms 
are more prone to manage earnings upwards due to which the SIZEit is expected to be negatively 
associated with earnings management actions. As it has been stated earlier in this section, total 
accruals are calculated as the difference between cash flow from operations (CFit) and net 
income. Thus, as the cash flows from operations increase, total accruals decrease (ceteris 
paribus). Hence, it is assumed that the coefficient of this variable to be negatively associated 
with earnings management practices. The performance of a company is measured with ROAit, 
and it has been discussed previously in this paper that companies with lower performance are 
more likely to manipulate earnings downwards. Therefore, ROAit is assumed to be positively 
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associated with discretionary accruals. The natural logarithm is used in total accruals, and it is 
expected that the coefficient of this variable (lnTACit) is positive as companies with high 
discretionary accruals are to have high value of total accruals. Finally, it is expected that as the 
earnings are managed downwards during financial crisis, this is not done by impairing goodwill. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the financial crisis dummy variable (FCi) decreases when earnings 
are managed downwards. Given this, FCi is expected to be positively associated with the 
discretionary accruals. 
6.2.2 Logistic regression 
In addition to the aforementioned OLS regression estimation model, big bath actions are 
examined by estimating a logistic regression model. As the previously presented OLS 
regression model examines earnings management actions in general, the logistic regression 
model examines whether Finnish publicly quoted companies have been engaged in big bath 
actions by using goodwill impairments. As it has been stated, big bath refers to a situation in 
which a company deliberately worsens net earnings (Healy, 1985). Therefore, it is assumed in 
this paper that only companies having the largest negative discretionary accruals may have been 
engaged in big bath actions. The direction of the discretionary accruals, that is, whether the 
firms have deliberately manipulated earnings upwards of downwards, is presented in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. The direction of earnings manipulation  
 
As it can be seen from the figure 5, of 899 firm-years observations spanning from 2005–2014, 
495 have manipulated their net earnings upwards, and 404 downwards. Of these downwards-
manipulating companies, not all companies can be engaged in big bath actions. This is simply 
because big bath actions assume that earnings have been drastically manipulated downwards. 
Hence, it is assumed that companies, which have manipulated their earnings upwards, 25 % of 
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the smallest discretionary accruals recorded companies have been engaged in big bath actions. 
Given these assumptions, 101 companies are expected to have used goodwill impairments as 
big bath actions. 
The use of goodwill impairments as big bath actions is examined by using logistic regression 
model. This is due to the fact that the dependent variable of the model, that is, whether the firm 
has engaged in big bath or not, is categorical. Given this, this variable is used as a proxy for big 
bath actions on the left-hand side of the regression model. Similar to the OLS regression model, 
the same independent variables are assumed to affect big bath actions. Given these, the logistic 
regression model is formulated as follows: 
Prob(BIG_BATHit)   =   ze1
1
                 (10) 
where
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In the logistic regression model (10), BIG_BATHit is the dependent variable and is coded as 1 
if company i is expected to have engaged in big bath actions in year t, and 0 otherwise. The 
independent variables have been explained in section 6.2.1.  As big bath actions increase, it is 
expected that it is due to management’s increased decision to impair goodwill. Given this, 
GW_IMPit is expected to be positively associated with BIG_BATHit. Similarly, the amounts of 
goodwill are expected to increase as big bath behavior increases. However, as goodwill 
impairments are modeled as negative values, IMPAIRit is expected to be negatively associated 
with the dependent variable. When firms engage in big bath actions, it is expected that goodwill 
does not increase. Given this rationale, it is expected that both GW_INCit and INCit are expected 
to be negatively associated with BIG_BATHit. According to prior literature, firms engaging in 
earnings management actions are more likely to have higher leverage ratio, and the firms are 
expected to be smaller. Given these, it is assumed that LEVit is positively associated, and SIZEit 
is expected to be negatively associated with the dependent variable. Similarly, cash flows are 
expected to be smaller when firms engage in earnings management, especially big bath, actions. 
Thereby, CFit is expected to be negatively associated with big bath actions. Firm performance 
is likely to be weaker in regards to big bath behavior. Hence, ROAit is expected to be negatively 
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associated with BIG_BATHit. Firms engaging in big bath are likely to have high total accruals. 
Thus, it is expected that total accruals (lnTACit) is positively associated with big bath behavior, 
that is, the dependent variable. In regards to the financial crisis dummy variable (FCi), it is 
expected that firms engaging in big bath behavior are not likely to use goodwill impairments to 
take a bath. Given this, it is expected that FCi is negatively associated with the dependent 
variable BIG_BATHit.
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7. RESULTS 
 
This section presents the results of the tests performed in this paper. However, the results 
regarding the modified Jones model to estimate the discretionary accruals are not tabulated. 
Instead, the results of the main tests are provided in this section. First, descriptive statistics on 
the independent variables are provided, after which the correlation between variables and 
regression results are presented. Finally, to test the validity of the results, robustness tests are 
performed. 
7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the independent variables (for both OLS and 
logistic regression model). The following variables have been chosen to be presented: 
observations, minimum, maximum, mean, median, standard deviation, and variance.  
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for independent variables in years 2005–2014 
GW_IMPit denotes a dummy variable which is coded to 1 if company i impairs goodwill in year t, and 0 otherwise. IMPAIRit 
is the amount of goodwill company i has impaired in year t. GW_INCit is a dummy variable coded to 1 if the amount of goodwill 
has increased in company i in year t, and 0 otherwise. INCit denotes the amount of increase in goodwill for company i in year 
t. LEVit is the ratio total debt to total assets for company i in year t. SIZEit denotes natural logarithm of total assets for company 
i in year t. CFit is the cash flow from operations for company i in year t. ROAit stands for return on assets for the company i in 
year t. ln TACit is the natural logarithm of the total accruals in company i in year t. FCi is a dummy variable coded to 1 if 
company i has recognized a goodwill impairment in years 2008–2009, and 0 otherwise.   
According to table 4, of all firm-year observations, only 31 per cent have recognized a goodwill 
impairment (GW_IMPit). Of these goodwill impairments (IMPAIRit), the largest impairment (-
1,581.00) in millions of euros has been recorded by Nokia Corporation in 2013. As the mean 
in goodwill impairments is only -11.69, the impairment of goodwill recorded by Nokia in 2013 
forms an outlier, which will be taken into account in the robustness tests in section 7.5. As the 
numbers are in millions of euros, the standard deviation and variance are very high compared 
Variable Observations Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Dev. Variance
GW_IMP it 899 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.02
IMPAIR it 899 -1,581.00 0.00 -11.69 0.00 85.65 7,336.73
GW_INC it 899 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.25
INC it 899 0.00 4,873.00 16.73 0.00 171.38 29,371.91
LEV it 899 0.00 14.39 0.84 0.58 1.26 1.58
SIZE it 899 0.28 10.59 5.76 5.50 1.90 3.62
CF it 899 -2,153.00 5,320.00 13.05 1.35 280.22 78,523.77
ROA it 899 -0.67 0.59 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.01
lnTAC it 899 -5.12 8.10 2.32 2.25 2.20 4.84
FC i 70 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.07
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to other factors’ corresponding numbers. Of all firm-year observations, 48 per cent have 
acquired more goodwill (GW_INCit) in business combinations. Of these increases in goodwill 
(INCit), the largest amount (4,873.00) has been recorded by Nokia Corporation as well in 2008. 
Consistent with the impairments, the goodwill increase recorded by Nokia in 2008 forms an 
outlier as the mean is only 16.73. However, this outlier will also be taken into consideration in 
the robustness tests. Again, the standard deviation and variance of this variable are very high 
compared to others. The ratio total debt to total assets varies between 0 and 14.39 while the 
mean being 0.84. Based on these, it seems that Finnish companies have not been that indebted 
on average during 2005–2014, even though there are some companies with relatively high 
leverage ratio. The size of the companies seems to vary a lot as the SIZEit varies between -0.07 
and 10.59. It must be, however, taken into account that this has been calculated as the natural 
logarithm of total assets. The mean is 5.76 whilst the standard deviation is 1.90. Cash flow from 
operations varies also a lot in the sample. The mean 13.05 implies relatively small amount of 
cash flows even though the minimum (-2,153.00) and maximum (5,320.00) have a large 
difference. Return on assets (ROAit) seems to be somewhat different in Finnish listed 
companies. The lowest ROAit is -0.67 while mean being only 0.03. On average, it can be said 
that Finnish companies have not performed that well during 2005–2014 even though there are 
some outliers as well. Total accruals vary also a lot as the standard deviation is 2.15, whereas 
the minimum and maximum being -5.12 and 8.10 respectively. 
The FCi variable takes into account the goodwill impairments during the years of financial 
crisis, that is, 2008–2009. It reveals that only 70 goodwill impairments have been recognized 
during the financial crisis years. In addition, goodwill amortizations (prior to year 2005) and 
goodwill impairments (after the adoption of IFRS) are demonstrated in figure 5. 
 
Figure 6. Yearly goodwill amortizations/impairments 
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As it can be seen in figure 5, Finnish listed companies have amortized more goodwill in years 
2001-2004, which is exactly prior to the adoption of IFRS standards. In fact, the amortizations 
recognized during 2001–2004 contribute 45.6 % of all recognized goodwill 
amortizations/impairments during the period 2001–2014. After the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
standards, the number of goodwill impairments has decreased drastically. During the financial 
crisis years, impairments have been recognized slightly more than usually after the adoption, 
but the level of impairments does not reach the level prior to the adoption. Only in 2013 a 
greater number of impairments has been recognized.  
 
7.2 Correlation between variables 
This subsection presents the correlations between the variables both in OLS and logistic 
regression models. First, the correlations between the variables in OLS regression are presented. 
For the sake of simplicity, the correlation matrix of logistic regression is not tabulated as it 
differs from the OLS only on the dependent variable. However, these differences are elaborated. 
7.2.1 OLS regression  
Table 5 illustrates a correlation matrix for the variables used in the OLS regression analysis, 
and it provides both Pearson (below the diagonal) and Spearman (above the diagonal) 
correlations. For each variable, the first row denotes the correlation coefficient, and the second 
row shows the two-tailed significance level (p-value). Statistically significant correlations at 
the 0.01 and 0.05 levels are marked with ** and * respectively. All variables can be included 
in the regression model due to their moderate correlation with each other. According to Niemi 
(2005), only correlation coefficients greater than 0.80 denote multicollinearity problems.  
From table 5, it can be seen that majority of the variables are not statistically significant. 
According to Pearson correlations (below the diagonal), the strongest, statistically significant 
negative correlation is between GW_INCit and GW_IMPit (-0.658), and strongest, statistically 
significant positive correlation (0.824) is between SIZEit and natural logarithm of total accruals 
(lnTACit). Furthermore, quite high positive correlation exists between goodwill impairment 
dummy variable (GW_IMPit) and financial crisis dummy variable (FC) with the correlation of 
0.429. This gives rise to assume to some extent that the decision to recognize a goodwill 
impairment is correlated with the financial crisis which is in line with the H2.
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Table 5. Correlation matrix (OLS regression) 
 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
1.000 -0.079* 0.090** 0.106** 0.127** -0.402** 0.150** 0.008 0.589** 0.375** -0.067*
0.017 0.007 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.817 <0.001 <0.001 0.046
-0.057 1.000 -0.754** 0.658** -0.613** 0.045 0.054 -0.112** -0.208** 0.050 0.429**
0.087 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.179 0.108 0.001 <0.001 0.130 <0.001
0.016 -0.201** 1.000 0.642** 0.598** -0.057 -0.120** 0.123** 0.226** -0.108** -0.402**
0.635 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.087 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001
0.028 -0.658** 0.132** 1.000 0.782** -0.102** 0.065 0.112** 0.201** 0.028 -0.282**
0.395 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 0.051 0.001 <0.001 0.394 <0.001
0.004 -0.066* 0.013 0.101** 1.000 -0.089** 0.195** 0.145** 0.205** 0.148** -0.263**
0.905 0.047 0.690 0.003 0.008 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
-0.162** 0.028 0.008 -0.077* -0.024 1.000 0.119** -0.167** -0.438** -0.026 0.076*
<0.001 0.408 0.812 0.021 0.473 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.430 0.023
0.009 0.054 -0.239** 0.060 0.162** -0.077* 1.000 0.179** 0.086* 0.765** 0.022
0.779 0.104 <0.001 0.070 <0.001 0.021 <0.001 0.010 <0.001 0.507
0.018 -0.075* 0.127** 0.066* 0.422** -0.056 0.103** 1.000 0.458** 0.041 -0.127**
0.595 0.025 <0.001 0.047 <0.001 0.095 0.002 <0.001 0.216 <0.001
0.370** -0.212** 0.049 0.168** 0.051 -0.300** 0.170** 0.184** 1.000 0.211** -0.159**
<0.001 <0.001 0.146 <0.001 0.128 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
0.214** 0.060 -0.201** 0.019 0.142** -0.114* 0.716** 0.088** 0.235** 1.000 0.021
<0.001 0.073 <0.001 0.571 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 0.008 <0.001 0.529
-0.047 0.429** -0.064 -0.282** -0.028 0.025 0.015 -0.066** -0.143** 0.027 1.000
0.164 <0.001 0.054 <0.001 0.395 0.452 0.645 0.047 <0.001 0.421
Notes
n = 899. See table 4 for definitions of the variables. Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal.
10. lnTAC it
11. FC i
1. ɛ it
2. GW_IMP it
3. IMPAIR it
4. GW_INC it
5. INC it
6. LEV it
7. SIZE it
8. CF it
9. ROA it
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According to Spearman correlations (above the diagonal), the strongest, statistically significant 
positive correlations (0.765) exist between SIZEit and total accruals lnTACit, and GW_INCit and 
INCit (0.782). Obviously, firm size is related to total accruals, and the increased goodwill is 
related to the amount of increased goodwill. The strongest negative correlation (-0.754) is 
between GW_IMPit and IMPAIRit. Naturally, as the GW_IMPit decreases, INCit increases (-
0.613). If the number of recognized goodwill impairments decreases, the amount of goodwill 
obviously increases to some extent. 
7.2.2 Logistic regression 
For the sake of simplicity, a separate correlation matrix regarding the logistic regression model 
is not tabulated. It is mainly similar to the above showed correlation matrix, except for the 
correlations with the dependent variable. Thereby, only the correlations regarding the different 
variable, that is, big bath actions, are under examination in this subsection. 
According to Pearson correlations (below the diagonal), BIG_BATHit has statistically 
significant negative correlations with the increase in goodwill (GW_INCit) dummy variable (-
0.120), SIZEit (-0.189), ROAit (-0.359) and natural logarithm of total accruals (-0.122). This 
implies that as the big bath actions increase, the goodwill decreases. Moreover, smaller firms 
with smaller ROA tend to be associated with big bath actions. However, it must be taken into 
account that these correlations seem not to be strong.  
Spearman correlations suggest somewhat same statistically significant correlation between 
BIG_BATHit and the aforementioned variables. In addition, BIG_BATHit has a negative (-0.130) 
statistically significant correlation with the increased amount of goodwill (INCit). This implies, 
however, the same as has been discussed above. Moreover, Spearman correlations suggest a 
positive (0.196), statistically significant correlation with leverage (LEVit). This gives rise to 
assume that as the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio increases, it is more prone to big bath actions as 
well. 
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7.3 Regression results 
7.3.1 OLS regression 
The results of OLS regression analysis are presented in table 6. This model provides R2 
(adjusted) = 23.3 (22.5) percent, which is quite high. This high explanatory power of the 
regression model is in line with previous studies (see Siregar and Utama, 2008; Bisogno, 2015).  
Table 6. OLS regression results 
 
Statistical (two-tailed) significance (p-values) better than 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
GW_IMPit denotes a dummy variable coded to 1 if company i impairs goodwill in year t, and 0 otherwise. IMPAIRit is the 
amount of impaired goodwill by company i in year t. GW_INCit is a dummy variable coded to 1 if the amount of goodwill has 
increased in company i in year t, and 0 otherwise. INCit denotes the increased amount of goodwill in company i in year t. LEVit 
is the ratio total debt to total assets for company i in year t. SIZEit denotes natural logarithm of total assets for company i in 
year t. CFit is the cash flow from operations for company i in year t. ROAit stands for return on assets for the company i in year 
t. ln TACit is the natural logarithm of the total accruals in company i in year t. FCi is a dummy variable coded to 1 if the company 
has recognized a goodwill impairment in years 2008–2009, and 0 otherwise. 
In contravention to expected, the coefficient of GW_IMPit is positive (0.001), but not 
statistically significant. The coefficient of IMPAIRit (7.24E-6) is in line with the expected sign. 
The decision to recognize an impairment is to decrease when earnings are managed downwards. 
Moreover, the positive sign of the coefficient of IMPAIRit implies that as earnings are managed 
downwards, the values of goodwill impairments increase. As the coefficients of these variables 
are not – together – in line with the expected and statistically significant, it seems that Finnish 
listed companies have not used goodwill impairments to deliberately manipulate earnings. 
Hence, we can reject H1. The coefficient of GW_INCit is negative in contravention to expected, 
and is not statistically significant. In line with expected, the sign of the amount of increased 
Variables Predicted Coefficient p -value
INTERCEPT ? 0.137 <0.001 ***
GW_IMP it - 0.001 0.914
IMPAIR it + 7.24E-6 0.887
GW_INC it + -0.003 0.789
INC it + 1.29E-5 0.629
LEV it - -0.005 0.139
SIZE it - -0.036 <0.001 ***
CF it - -7.81E-6 0.479
ROA it + 0.456 <0.001 ***
lnTAC it + 0.035 <0.001 ***
FC i + -0.007 0.678
Model summary
n 899
p -value <0.001***
R
2 0.233
Adj. R
2 0.225
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goodwill (INCit) is positive, but it is not statistically significant. The results suggest that as firms 
manage earnings downwards, the firm is more likely to have higher leverage (-0.005). However, 
LEVit is not either statistically significant. As it was expected, firm size (SIZEit) is negative 
implying that relatively smaller firms do manage earnings upwards. This variable is also 
statistically significant at p<0.001 implying that it contributes well to the model. CFit is negative 
(-7.81E-6) as expected denoting that decrease in cash flows is associated with earnings 
management actions. The coefficient is, however, very close to zero. Cash flow from operations 
is not statistically significant with p-value of 0.479. Firm performance (ROAit) is supposed to 
indicate that firms with lower ROA are more prone to manage earnings downwards. The results 
do support this as the coefficient of ROAit is positive (0.456). In addition, ROAit is statistically 
significant. lnTACit is positive as expected, and statistically significant. Hence, this is consistent 
with the argument that companies with high total accruals have higher discretionary accruals 
as well. The FCi coefficient is negative (-0.007) implying that as earnings are managed 
downwards, more goodwill impairments are recognized during the financial crisis. This 
variable is not, however, statistically significant (0.678) so this may be coincidence. This 
implies that the null hypothesis H2 is true. 
7.3.2 Logistic regression 
Table 7. Logistic regression results 
 
Variables Predicted Coefficient p -value
INTERCEPT ? -0.114 0.821
GW_IMP it + -0.784 0.019 *
IMPAIR it - -0.001 0.380
GW_INC it - -0.738 0.015 *
INC it - -0.008 0.454
LEV it + 0.073 0.300
SIZE it - -0.334 0.003 **
CF it - 0.001 0.494
ROA it - -9.409 <0.001 ***
lnTAC it + 0.205 0.042 *
FC i - -0.131 0.779
Model summary
n 899
Wald chi-square 383,037
p -value <0.001***
-2 Loglikelihood 506,301
Pseudo R
2
0.130
Statistical (two-tailed) significance (p-values) better than 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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The results of logistic regression analysis are presented in table 7. It can be seen that the model 
is highly significant (p < 0.001) and has a pseudo R2 of 13.0 percent. The dependent variable, 
BIG_BATHit is coded as 1 if the company is assumed to have engaged in big bath actions, and 
0 otherwise. Thereby, the signs of the coefficient of independent variables indicate the direction 
of the effect on the likelihood of company to be engaged in big bath actions.  
From table 7, it can be seen that the signs of the coefficients are not entirely in line with the 
expectations. The decision to impair goodwill (GW_IMPit) is expected to increase as firms 
engage in big bath actions, but the coefficient (-0.784) is negative. This implies that the 
decisions to recognize a goodwill impairment are very likely to decrease when big bath actions 
increase. It must be taken into account that GW_IMPit is statistically significant at level p<0.05, 
which implies that firms are very likely to decrease the amount of impairments when they 
engage in big bath actions. In other words, as firms engage more in big bath actions, they do 
not use goodwill impairments to worsen net earnings. Firms are more likely to engage in big 
bath behavior by using other accruals, as can be noted from the coefficient of lnTACit (0.205). 
The coefficient of the amount of goodwill impairment (IMPAIRit) is negative (-0.001) as 
expected. However, IMPAIRit is not statistically significant. GW_INCit is negative (-0.738) as 
expected and significant as well. This implies that firms are unlikely to acquire entities when 
they decide to take a bath, as the amount of goodwill does not increase. The signs of the 
coefficients of other variables – except CFit – are in line with expectations. Firm size (SIZEit) 
is negative (-0.334) and statistically significant implying that smaller firms engage in big bath 
actions. Furthermore, the results indicate that firm performance (ROAit) is very negatively (-
9.409) associated with big bath, and statistically significant at level p<0.001. This implies that 
firms, which are about to report significantly lower earnings than others, are very likely to 
engage in big bath behavior. This seems to be very dominant factor in Finnish publicly quoted 
companies. Firms having higher (0.205) total accruals (lnTACit) are to use big bath as the 
variable is statistically significant. Finally, financial crisis (FCi) is negatively associated (-
0.131) as expected but not statistically significant. Hence, Finnish listed companies have not 
used goodwill impairments as an accrual-based big bath vehicle during the financial crisis. 
7.4 Interpretation of results 
In this subsection, the results of the regression analysis are interpreted and compared to the 
hypotheses presented in section 5. As it has been stated, this paper contributes to prior 
accounting literature due to the fact that although Finnish listed companies have been included 
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in many studies (for example, see André et al. 2015), the results regarding these companies 
have not been reported separately. An interesting issue is how the results of this paper are 
related to prior literature due to which the results of this study are reflected to the most similar 
studies currently available. 
The results of OLS regression analysis suggest that Finnish listed companies have not been 
committed to impair goodwill as a purpose to deliberately manipulate earnings. In other words, 
Finnish companies have not used goodwill impairments as an accrual-based earnings 
management vehicle. Contrary to what was expected, the decision to impair goodwill 
(GW_IMPit) as well as the amount of impaired goodwill (IMPAIRit) are not statistically 
significant in the OLS regression model. Moreover, the coefficients of these variables are not 
entirely in line with expected. As the discretionary accruals are used as a proxy for earnings 
manipulation, the results show that Finnish listed companies have not used goodwill 
impairments to – in general – manipulate earnings. Moreover, the results of logistic regression 
analysis show that both GW_IMPit and IMPAIRit are negatively associated with big bath actions, 
and statistically significant. Based on these, it can be stated that the findings do not support H1. 
On the contrary, the logistic regression results suggest that firms take baths by using other 
accruals, not goodwill impairments.  
To support the rejection of H1, Finnish listed companies had recognized goodwill amortizations 
substantially more prior to the adoption of IFRS standards than subsequently. It must be taken 
into account, however, that those amortizations were recognized on a straight-line basis. To 
some extent, it seems that Finnish listed companies have used the discretion permitted by IFRS 
not to recognize goodwill impairments. Not a single year’s number of goodwill impairments 
corresponds with the number of goodwill amortizations recognized prior to the adoption year 
of IFRS standards. One reason might also be the principle of prudence. Prudence has been the 
bedrock of Finnish Accounting Act, and it seems to be that Finnish publicly quoted companies 
have applied this principle as they have not used goodwill impairments to manipulate earnings. 
The regression results indicate that the only factors which are statistically significant and thus 
contribute well to the regression model are firm size SIZEit, ROAit and total accruals lnTACit. 
Given these, it seems that relatively smaller firms are more likely to manage earnings upwards. 
However, firms are likely to be smaller if they take baths. Moreover, logistic regression results 
suggest, in addition to aforementioned, that firm performance (ROAit) is very negatively 
associated with big bath actions, and statistically significant. This implies that firms with very 
low performance are likely to engage in big bath behavior. This seems to be really dominant 
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variable to affect big bath behavior. Firms having larger total accruals are – obviously – more 
likely to manage earnings. Total accruals being statistically significant seems logical as 
earnings management actions are to increase when the value of total accruals increase, ceteris 
paribus. 
The goodwill impairments recognized during the financial crisis years are negatively associated 
with earnings management actions in general. This implies that as firms manage earnings 
downwards, more goodwill impairments are recognized. However, FCi is not statistically 
significant with p-value of 0.678 implying that this may be coincidence. In other words, 
companies are less likely to use goodwill impairments to practice accrual-based earnings 
management during the crisis years. As the financial crisis dummy variable (FCi) is not 
statistically significant – and the coefficient signs are not entirely in line with expected – this 
implies that goodwill impairments are not associated with earnings manipulation – including 
big bath actions. The number of goodwill impairments rose during the financial crisis years, but 
it does not necessarily indicate earnings management actions. As prudence is one of the most 
important principles in Finnish reporting environment, it is possible that more firms have 
recognized goodwill impairments due to uncertainty, thus applying the concept of prudence. 
The findings of this paper are totally new and different from prior literature as they are not fully 
consistent with prior studies. For instance, Alves (2013) uses modified Jones model and by 
controlling some institutional factors (audit quality and board size), she finds that goodwill 
impairments are related to earnings management actions in Portuguese publicly quoted 
companies. Moreover, Bisogno (2015) documents that also Italian listed companies do use 
goodwill impairments to manipulate net earnings. Similar to Bisogno (2015), almost same 
estimation model with slight modifications is used in this paper, and the explanatory power of 
this paper is similar to Bisogno’s (2015). Compared to a wide gamut of big bath accounting 
literature, the results of this paper are not in line with those. For example, Haman and Jubb 
(2007) examine Australian firms by using modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) and find 
that some firms use goodwill impairments to take a bath. However, this paper documents no 
sign of using goodwill impairments as big bath actions. 
7.5 Robustness checks 
To test the validity of the results of this paper, four robustness checks are performed. The 
discretionary accruals are estimated as previously, using modified Jones model with additional 
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modifications. After this, the main tests of this paper are performed as follows: First, H1 and H2 
are tested with a minor modification, that is, yearly changes in cash flows from operations are 
taken into consideration. Second, in addition to the first, corresponding regression analyses are 
performed excluding the outliers in INCit (4,873.00) and CFit (-2,153.00 and 5,320.00). These 
robustness check are performed in section (a). Third, in section (b), H2 is retested by dividing 
the sample of this paper into sub-sample. Finally, in section (c), big bath behavior is re-
examined by taking into consideration only companies with negative discretionary accruals.   
 (a) Additional robustness tests for H1 and H2 
The estimation model used to examine whether goodwill impairments are associated with 
earnings management actions does not take into account the yearly changes in cash flows. 
However, it is important to take the yearly changes in cash flows into consideration as cash 
flows from operations may change substantially during the financial crisis years. As the cash 
flows may change drastically during crisis years, firms may be more prone to recognize 
impairments. In addition to taking yearly changes in cash flows into consideration, OLS 
regression is performed without the outlier in increased goodwill (4,873) and cash flow from 
operations (-2,153 and 5,320). Given these assumptions, the robustness check is performed with 
the following estimation model: 
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where, 
ΔCFit Yearly changes in cash flow from operations for company i in year t 
Y2005i–2014i Dummy variables; coded to 1 if company i has recognized goodwill impairment 
in that certain year, and 0 otherwise. 
All other variables are described earlier. Due to the multicollinearity problem with variables 
Y2008i and Y2009i, the dummy variable FC has been removed. This is not necessary as the 
multicollinearity concerns can be discarded on dummy variables. The replacing variables, 
however, take into account the goodwill impairments during the financial crisis years.  
The (untabulated) results – which apply to samples both including and excluding the outliers in 
the increased goodwill and cash flow from operations – indicate the same results as were 
(11) 
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discovered in previous section. These results are not tabulated as they do not otherwise differ 
from the results of the main test of this paper. All variables indicate same kinds of results as the 
test performed in section 7.3.  
 (b) Additional robustness test for H2 
In order to examine whether the goodwill impairments are associated with earnings 
management actions during the financial crisis, the sample is divided into a sub-sample which 
takes into account only the financial crisis years. For this sample, the same test as in the first 
robustness test is performed. 
The untabulated results of this regression analysis indicate that the explanatory power of this 
estimation model is higher than previously with R2 (adjusted R2) = 31.4 (28.2) per cent. The 
signs of the coefficients are robust to findings as are the statistically significant variables 
(SIZEit) and (lnTACit) as well. Based on these findings, the robustness checks indicate that the 
findings of this paper are robust. 
(c) Additional robustness test for big bath behavior 
To test the validity of the results regarding big bath actions, the same logistic regression model 
is performed. However, only companies with negative discretionary accruals are taken into 
account. Thereby, we get more precise view whether companies, who have manipulated 
earnings downwards, have used goodwill impairments as big bath actions. The (untabulated) 
results indicate the same as was discovered. However, none of the goodwill impairment or 
goodwill increase variables were statistically significant. Hence, the interpretations are not 
altered, and the results are valid. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether Finnish listed companies have used goodwill 
impairments – in general – to deliberately manipulate net earnings. However, this paper also 
examines whether these companies have been engaged in big bath actions. Finnish listed 
companies have been stipulated to compile their consolidated financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS since 2005. From this point of view, the topic is relevant as it is important 
to understand the consequences of the adoption of IFRS on the opportunities for earnings 
manipulation by exploiting goodwill impairments. IFRS standards have been criticized as they 
permit a lot of discretion for the managers. Goodwill – and thus goodwill impairments as well 
– are mostly determined by the management, which indicates that goodwill as an asset is indeed 
very vulnerable to earnings management actions. This paper contributes to prior accounting 
literature in three ways. First, although Finnish listed companies have been included in many 
studies (for example, see André et al. 2015), the results regarding these companies have not 
been reported separately. Second, standard setters need to know whether certain standards and 
accruals are vulnerable to earnings management. Given this, standard setters may be aware of 
this regarding Portuguese and Italian listed companies, but Finnish reporting environment 
brings another dimension to this. Third, as company’s decision to impair goodwill or not seems 
to be an important corporate event due to the influence on firm performance and thus market 
value (Hirschey and Richardson, 2002), it is important to examine whether IFRS 3 and IAS 36 
constrain the management’s discretion to impair goodwill.  
The sample of the data comprises 899 firm-year observations spanning from 2005–2014. In 
addition, the data are obtained also from the years 2000–2004 to document the number of 
goodwill amortizations. The purpose of this separate documentation is to examine whether the 
goodwill impairments recognized 2005–2014 differ substantially from the amortizations prior 
to the adoption of IFRS. To test the hypotheses of this paper, the discretionary accruals are first 
estimated by using modified Jones model. This paper documents that Finnish listed companies 
have been recognizing goodwill impairments less than amortizations prior to the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. The results of the regression analysis demonstrate that goodwill impairments 
recognized during 2005–2014 are not associated with earnings manipulation in general, or with 
big bath actions. Moreover, the results illustrate that financial crisis affect negatively earnings 
manipulation from the point of view of goodwill impairments, and they are not associated with 
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accrual-based earnings management during the financial crisis. In addition to these results, four 
robustness tests are performed to assure the validity of the results.  
The findings of this paper are not consistent with the results of Alves’ (2013) or Bisogno’s 
(2015). While they document that Portuguese and Italian companies – respectively – use 
goodwill impairments to manipulate earnings, Finnish companies do not seem to complement 
this view. Moreover, this paper documents opposite results to big bath literature (see Giacomino 
and Akers, 2009; Jordan and Clark, 2004) suggesting that Finnish listed companies have not 
been engaged in big bath behavior following the adoption of IFRS. In regards to financial crisis, 
this paper documents that Finnish listed companies did not use goodwill impairments as an 
accrual based earnings management. One possible reason for these observations might be the 
principle of prudence. This principle is the main principle of Finnish Accounting Act, and even 
though Finnish listed companies are to apply IFRS, the principle of prudence may have been 
the underlying factor in the accounting choices of companies. However, the findings of this 
paper support the view of Donnelly and Keys (2002) as well as Colquitt and Wilson (2002). 
They argue that goodwill impairment test better satisfies the underlying expectations of the 
analysts. Hence, as the goodwill impairments do not seem to be associated with earnings 
manipulation in Finland, goodwill impairments do seem to better capture the decline in the 
value of goodwill in a more meaningful manner than the amortization approach. 
The findings of this paper have implications for both financial statements users and standard 
setters. As it has been discussed, financial statement users ought to take into consideration that 
many firms – both in Finland and internationally – have a practical earnings management 
vehicle, that is, goodwill, at their disposal on their balance sheets. For financial statement users, 
there might exist a reason to consider for the possible misrepresentation of earnings if the 
company has a significant balance sheet value of goodwill. As it turns out, however, the 
reporting environment seems to affect earnings management actions. For instance, Italian listed 
firms seem to manipulate their net earnings through goodwill impairments (Bisogno, 2015), but 
Italian reporting environment differ from the Finnish one. Finnish companies are to apply the 
principle of prudence which presumably affects the results – even though IFRS regulation is 
same cross-nationally. Standard-setters ought to take these variations regarding the reporting 
environments into consideration. The results of this paper, Alves’ (2013) and Bisogno’s (2015) 
illustrate that even though the standards (IFRS) are the same cross-nationally, they might not 
be applied in same manner internationally. 
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The major limitation of this paper is that it focuses on whether Finnish listed companies have 
used goodwill impairments as an accrual-based earnings management vehicle, and whether 
there are indications of big bath behavior. It does not take into account whether the companies 
are smoothing, minimizing or maximizing earnings, and thus avoiding goodwill impairments. 
Moreover, it does not take into consideration whether institutional factors affect the earnings 
management actions. This paper focuses on all listed firms in Finland, not only ones that 
recognize goodwill impairments. Given this, it must be emphasized that this paper is 
consciously focusing on Finnish listed companies in general. It is good to acknowledge that if 
only companies which recognize goodwill impairments are taken into account, the results might 
be different. In addition, focused this paper on certain industry, the results might be different as 
well. The findings of this paper cannot be generalized as they only apply to Finnish listed 
companies in a certain period of time. 
There is probably a plethora of paths to continue beyond this study, but this study could be 
complemented with a couple of paths. First, it would be eminently interesting to examine to 
what extent Finnish listed companies use goodwill impairments to income smoothing, income 
maximizing, and income minimizing. Moreover, it would be worthwhile to investigate these 
factors by taking into consideration different industries. Second, institutional factors affecting 
goodwill impairment recognitions would be an important target of examination. This kind of a 
study ought to be, however, conducted by examining cross-national firms. By taking into 
account several institutional factors, such as shareholder protection, growth rate of the 
economy, financial tax-alignment, spending on auditing, accrual index, etc. we would gain a 
more comprehensive understanding of the factors which in reality affect the decisions to impair 
goodwill.
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